Legislating A Negative Right to Health: Health Impact Assessments by Ho, Christina S.
HO-FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2019 3:51 PM 
 
643 
Legislating A Negative Right to Health: Health Impact 
Assessments 
Christina S. Ho* 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 645 
A. The Need to Consider Health Even Within Non-Health 
Policies ................................................................................. 648 
B. HIA as a Negative Right .......................................................... 653 
C. What is a Health Impact Assessment? ...................................... 654 
1. Link Between Health Impact Assessment and Equity ........ 655 
D. History and Precedent ............................................................. 657 
E. Model of a Right as a Privileged Distributed Interest 
Triggering Special Justification Duties .................................. 659 
1. Individuation/Claiming ..................................................... 659 
2. Privileged: Needing Special Justification to Overcome 
Presumption .................................................................... 661 
3. Three Common Elements .................................................. 663 
II. RIGHTS IN REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
STATUTES .................................................................................... 664 
A. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) ...................................... 665 
1. Scope ................................................................................ 666 
2. Sufficiency of Purpose ...................................................... 667 
3. Fit ..................................................................................... 667 
4. Claiming ........................................................................... 668 
5. History .............................................................................. 669 
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) as amended by the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 
(“SBREFA”) ......................................................................... 671 
1. Scope ................................................................................ 672 
2. Sufficiency of Purpose ...................................................... 672 
3. Fit ..................................................................................... 672 
 
* I am grateful to both Robert Evans and Chinsu Shajan for excellent research assistance.  
Also, many thanks to John Leubsdorf, Carlos Gonzalez, Jeanne Lambrew, Doug Farquar, 
Stuart Green, Scott Burris, Sabrina Safrin, Jim Pope, David Noll, Reid Weisbord, Taja-Nia 
Henderson, Yuliya Guseva, Jorge Contesse, Anju Gupta, Jordan Paradise, Jessica Wentz, 
Glenn Cohen and his students, Victoria Nourse, Alan Morrison, Bijal Shah, Eric A. 
Friedman, Larry Gostin, and John T. Monahan. 
HO (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2019  3:51 PM 
644 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:643 
4. Claiming ........................................................................... 673 
5. History .............................................................................. 674 
C. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) ............................ 675 
1. Scope ................................................................................ 675 
2. Sufficiency of Purpose ...................................................... 676 
3. Fit ..................................................................................... 676 
4. Claiming ........................................................................... 677 
5. History .............................................................................. 677 
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) .............................. 678 
1. Regulatory Sufficiency of Purpose .................................... 679 
2. Regulatory Fit ................................................................... 679 
3. Regulatory Claiming ......................................................... 679 
4. Legislative Sufficiency of Purpose .................................... 680 
5. Legislative Fit ................................................................... 682 
6. Legislative Claiming ......................................................... 683 
7. History .............................................................................. 685 
III. OTHER EXAMPLES OF SIMILAR LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY 
HEIGHTENED JUSTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS .............................. 685 
A. Endangered Species Act (ESA) ............................................... 685 
1. Scope ................................................................................ 686 
2. Sufficiency of Purpose ...................................................... 687 
3. Fit ..................................................................................... 687 
4. Claiming ........................................................................... 687 
5. History .............................................................................. 688 
B. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) ............... 688 
1. History .............................................................................. 688 
2. Scope ................................................................................ 690 
3. Sufficiency of Purpose ...................................................... 690 
4. Fit ..................................................................................... 690 
5. Claiming ........................................................................... 691 
6. Isomorphism ..................................................................... 691 
C. Assessment of Federal Regulations and Policies on Families ... 692 
1. Sufficiency of Purpose and Fit .......................................... 692 
2. Claiming ........................................................................... 693 
D. Private Property/Takings Executive Order ............................... 693 
1. Scope ................................................................................ 693 
2. Sufficiency of Purpose ...................................................... 694 
3. Fit ..................................................................................... 694 
4. No Claiming under Executive Orders ................................ 694 
E. Other Impact Assessments Established by the Executive 
Branch .................................................................................. 695 
F. Regulatory Right to Know ....................................................... 697 
G. Agency-Specific RIAs............................................................. 698 
HO  (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2019  3:51 PM 
2020] LEGISLATING A NEGATIVE RIGHT TO HEALTH 645 
IV. THE GLARING OMISSION OF HEALTH ................................................ 698 
A. Health is Not on Equal Footing ............................................... 698 
V. THE PROPOSAL .................................................................................. 699 
A. Participatory ........................................................................... 701 
B. Equity ..................................................................................... 702 
C. Impact Analysis ...................................................................... 703 
D. Sufficiency of Purpose ............................................................ 703 
E. Fit ........................................................................................... 704 
F. Enforcement/Claiming ............................................................. 704 
G. Lookback Review of Existing Federal Laws ............................ 705 
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 705 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the U.S., we are accustomed to treating right-to-health arguments 
as non-starters, outside the realm of serious possibility.1  Yet curiously, our 
American aversion to the health rights discourse does not necessarily 
reflect rejection of “health” as a value.2  Instead, our attitude seems based 
on a misperception that health rights are inevitably a type of socio-
economic right to affirmative state provision rather than a negative liberty 
from state action.3  This latter type of right, the negative liberty, is thought 
to be more congenial to the American legal tradition, while the former is 
regarded as a non-justiciable and quixotically foreign concept.4  However 
 
 1  Even those who strongly favor such a right have judged U.S. health rights even after 
the enactment of the Affordable Care Act to be “unstable,” “weak,” and “elusive.”  See 
Allison K. Hoffman, A Vision of an Emerging Right to Health Care in the United States: 
Expanding Health Care Equity Through Legislative Reform, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT 
THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 345, 345–346 (Colleen M. 
Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014) (describing how even legislated rights are often weakened 
by courts); David Orentlicher, Rights to Healthcare in the United States: Inherently 
Unstable, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 326, 326 (2012) (documenting the ways in which the 
Affordable Care Act fails to change the historical weakness of the right to health in the 
U.S.).  See generally Jennifer Prah Ruger et al., The Elusive Right to Health Care Under 
U.S. Law, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2558 (2015); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State 
Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325 (2010). 
 2  See e.g., William W. Buzbee, CPR Perspective: The Strategies of Regulatory 
Underkill, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, http://www.progressivereform.org/perspUnderki 
ll.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).  Indeed, polls show health care was among the most 
important issues in the most recent midterms.  See e.g., Robert Pearl, Healthcare Is the No. 
1 Issue for Voters; A New Poll Reveals Which Healthcare Issue Matters Most, FORBES (Aug 
13, 2018, 07:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2018/08/13/midterms/#3865 
7bee3667.   
 3  See e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
CARE? 59–79 (1997). 
 4  See, e.g., Frank Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 862 
(2001).  But see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
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much we may value health, the argument runs, we would distort or break 
with our foundational legal character if we recognized health values in the 
form of a “right.” 
Meanwhile, on another front, a different battle over rights is running 
its course.  Observers note that our policymaking functions are now held to 
cost-benefit default requirements imposed both by courts,5 and by an 
executive order that has proven durable regardless of the President’s party 
affiliation.6  Even now, Congress is considering codifying such a 
requirement.7  This default requirement of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), 
assumed to apply unless Congress clearly intends a different regulatory 
standard, has come under criticism on a variety of fronts.  CBA posits a 
utilitarian world in which values are aggregative and fungible, and thus 
capable of being added and traded-off against one another.8  In response, 
many have argued that the ascendance of cost-benefit analysis detracts 
from non-utilitarian values like rights, distribution, the integrity of human 
life, and dignity.9  For instance, CBA privileges efficiency over distributive 
goals, as one commentator has succinctly described: “[A]ll transfer 
programs flunk standard CBA: one side loses what another gains, plus 
somebody pays for administrative costs.”10  Moreover, rights are short-
 
2271, 2273, 2278–79 (1990).  
 5  See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–08 (2015) (requiring agency to weigh 
costs against benefits, unless Congress clearly states otherwise).  See generally Cass R. 
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651 (2001).  
 6  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (which has been 
retained in substantially similar form through Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, Bush II, and Obama 
Administrations).  
 7  Portman-Heitkamp Regulatory Accountability Act, S. 951, 115th Cong. § 3(b)(5) 
(2017) https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/951/text.  See also, 
Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017).  The bill would require all 
agencies, including independent agencies, to consider a “reasonable number of [regulatory] 
alternatives” and select the “most cost-effective” rule, unless “the additional benefits of the 
more costly rule justify the additional costs of that rule.”  This requirement is sometimes 
called the “super mandate.”  See e.g., William Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory 
Muddle: The “Legislative Mirage” of Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 298, 306 (1996). 
 8  See e.g., SIDNEY SHAPIRO & ROBERT GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: 
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 54 (2002). 
 9  See e.g., Frank Ackerman & Liza Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1567 (2002) (discussing 
that it may not be possible to limit the effects of CBA to just those areas for which CBA is 
suitable because there are spillover or displacing effects, including that “cost benefit 
analysis turns public citizens into selfish consumers and interconnected communities into 
atomized individuals”).  See generally MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE 
MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012); Kristen Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace 
Intrinsic Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks to Confront the Challenge of 
Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 213 (2016). 
 10  Adam Samaha, Death and Paperwork Reduction, 65 DUKE L.J. 279, 324 (2015) 
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shrifted under CBA’s utilitarian approach insofar as rights bind without 
regard to individual case-by-case consequences.11  The nature of rights is 
such that an individual’s rights cannot be sacrificed to the greater collective 
welfare as a matter of course.  Thus CBA, by subjecting all values to trade-
off, fails to adequately acknowledge that some values take the form of 
rights. 
What if we had a way to value health as a right while remaining 
squarely within the American tradition of rights as negative liberties from 
state action?  And what if this method could also serve as a corrective to 
CBA’s blind-spots on rights and distribution?  I argue in this article that 
Health Impact Assessments (HIAs) would achieve precisely these things.  
Therefore, I propose that we require an assessment of all federal regulation 
and legislation for its potential impact on human health and its distribution, 
even if the policies lie outside what is traditionally considered the health 
sector.  This HIA requirement, like the other regulatory impact analyses I 
discuss below, would also require Congress or an agency, if it were to 
pursue such action burdening human health, to expressly justify the adverse 
health effects imposed by such action.12  If anything, the regulatory reform 
measures that are currently before Congress, rather than mandating CBA 
by statute, should include this modest, common-sense, new regulatory 
impact assessment requirement.13 
My argument is indirect.  Others have made strong cases for HIAs on 
the merits.  I seek to demonstrate that HIAs should be institutionalized 
because we have already adopted a set of other regulatory impact 
assessments (RIAs) privileging non-health values such as economic 
freedom for small business, freedom from paperwork, economic protection 
for states and localities, religious liberty, and more,14 all of which compete 
with health.  These existing RIAs represent the selective elevation, by 
rights-like means, of a highly biased set of priorities with which health 
ought to be placed on equal footing. 
 
(citing Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-effectiveness Analysis, 53 DUKE L.J. 
1067, 1060–69, 1076 (2003)).  This pithy conclusion depends upon CBA being 
administered without regard to the fact that the relation between wealth and utility varies 
non-linearly, such that the marginal decrease in a wealthy person’s utility from the loss of a 
dollar might be lower than the marginal increase to a less well-off person from gaining a 
dollar. 
 11  Even utilitarians can acknowledge rights as absolute and indefeasible in this sense.  
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 1, 61–63 (H.B. Acton ed., 1972) (distinguishing rights from expedience). 
 12  See infra Part V for full description. 
 13  See e.g., supra note 7; Cross, supra note 4, at 863. 
 14  See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015) 
(arguing that religious liberty is a new guise for economic libertarianism).  
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A. The Need to Consider Health Even Within Non-Health Policies 
The greatest health challenges today are complex and have many 
linked contributing factors, some of which operate far upstream, outside 
what we conventionally regard as health policy.  It is by now widely 
recognized that policies beyond the traditional health-sector affect our 
health outcomes no less than policies within our so-called health system.15  
An oft-cited early report from the Centers for Disease Control credited 
medical care with only ten to fifteen percent of the reductions in mortality 
achieved during the twentieth century.16  Our knowledge base has now 
grown to recognize how “social determinants of health” may have at least 
as much effect on health outcomes.17 
Thanks to environmental law, many of us recognize that hazardous 
chemical exposures in our air, water, food, and workplaces burden human 
health.  But we are increasingly learning more about the importance of our 
social and economic conditions as well. 
Housing and our built environment are examples of distal or upstream 
factors, wrought by collective policy, that affect population health in 
complex socially-mediated ways.18  For instance, lopsided mortgage 
interest subsidies to the affluent divert resources from quality affordable 
housing options, which we know in turn subjects people to hazardous 
exposures such as lead or mold.  Indeed, our policy paradigms, such as 
those that beget urban sprawl, have been associated with numerous other 
health effects.  One study found that for every one percent increase in 
county compactness (a sprawl index), “traffic fatality rates fell by 1.49 
percent and pedestrian fatality rates fell by 1.47 percent.”19  These effects 
are a function of government action.20  For example, federal housing 
financing has long favored low-density single-family homes.21  
 
 15  See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Ten Great Public Health 
Achievements—United States 1900–1999, 48 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 241 
(April 1999).   
 16  Id. 
 17  See e.g., Jessica Mantel, Tackling the Social Determinants of Health: A Central Role 
for Providers, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 217, 221 (2017). 
 18  Lauren Taylor, Housing and Health: An Overview of the Literature, HEALTH AFF. 
(June 7, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20180313.396577/full/. 
 19  Reid Ewing & Shima Hamidi, Compactness v. Sprawl: A Review of Recent Evidence 
from the United States, 30 J. PLANNING LIT. 413, 425 (2015); PAULA BRAVEMAN ET AL., 
HOUSING AND HEALTH (2011), https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2011/05/housing-
and-health.html. 
 20  KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 229–230 (1985). 
 21  See id.  See also Heather Hughes, Securitization and Suburbia, 90 OR. L. REV. 359, 
391–94 (2011) (tracing how laws governing commercial finance facilitate sprawl); Emily 
Badger, How the Federal Government Dramatically Skews the U.S. Real Estate Market, 
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Government-financed roads literally paved the way for the automobile.22  
Development assumed its particular character because of single-use zoning 
laws as well as ordinances stipulating setbacks and parking.23  The effects 
on human well-being, through physical, mental, and social pathways, are 
manifold.24  Meanwhile, housing instability among renters gravely harms 
health, especially the health of children in the household.25  Yet the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development is pursuing new work 
requirements to encumber the restricted housing assistance that is 
available.26 
The governance of work itself has permitted scheduling and other 
arrangements to offload ever more contingency onto workers, increasing 
toxic stress and fatigue.27  And each sector we examine reveals the source 
of additional health burdens.  Our transportation policies often create new 
accident and other risks, as the rise of the railroad28 and the automobile 
have made clear.29 
 
CITYLAB (Jan. 8, 2013), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2013/01/how-us-government-
dramatically-real-estate-market/4337/ (documenting that, even recently, “FHA, for instance, 
funneled just one-tenth of its $1.2 trillion in loan guarantees over the past five years toward 
multi-family housing”).   
 22  See Jackson, supra note 20. 
 23  Id. 
 24 Andrew L. Dannenberg et al., The Impact of Community Design and Land-Use 
Choices on Public Health: A Scientific Research Agenda, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1500, 
1500–08 (2003).   
 25  Megan Sandel et al., Unstable Housing and Caregiver and Child Health in Renter 
Families, 141 PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2018). 
 26  Kriston Capps, HUD May Push New Work Requirements for Public Housing 
Residents, CITYLAB (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/02/hud-floats-
work-requirements-for-public-housing-residents/552173/. 
 27  See, e.g., HUMAN IMPACT PARTNERS, SCHEDULING AWAY OUR HEALTH: HOW 
UNPREDICTABLE WORK HOURS AFFECT HEALTH AND WELL-BEING (2016), 
http://www.humanimpact.org/wp-content/uploads/Scheduling-Away-Our-Health_rev3.pdf.  
Such transformation of the workforce has been facilitated by government designation of 
these workers as outside certain categories of protection.  See, e.g., Karla Walter & Kate 
Bahn, Raising Pay and Providing Benefits for Workers in a Disruptive Economy, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2 
017/10/13/440483/raising-pay-providing-benefits-workers-disruptive-economy/.  See 
generally JEFFREY PFEFFER, DYING FOR A PAYCHECK (2018). 
 28  See generally MARK ALDRICH, DEATH RODE THE RAILS: AMERICAN RAILROAD 
ACCIDENTS AND SAFETY 1828–1965 (2006).  For discussion of how tort law responded to 
this externalization of costs by railroads onto others, see MORTON HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, 97–101 (1977) (observing that “most of 
the cases involving injuries to persons or property after 1840 were brought about by the 
activity of canals or railroads”).  
 29  See generally JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO 
SAFETY (1991).  See e.g., Sandro Galea, Making the Acceptable Unacceptable, B.U. SCH. 
PUB. HEALTH (June 4, 2015), https://www.bu.edu/sph/2015/06/14/making-the-acceptable-
unacceptable/ (observing that “[d]espite a dramatic increase in number of vehicle miles 
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Our agricultural and economic development subsidies may be 
transferring risk from agricultural and fast-food enterprises to individuals.  
When we subsidize corn rather than fruits and vegetables, even as cheap 
high-fructose corn syrup has fostered excessive consumption of added 
sugars, do we consider the potential health effects?30  Meanwhile the Small 
Business Administration has poured funding into fast-food franchises in 
low-income neighborhoods in the name of urban revitalization,31 even as 
land use, zoning and other regulations deterred supermarkets from locating 
there.32 
Socioeconomic conditions, including relative social position,33 are 
powerful determinants of health.34  Even when poverty and deprivation 
recede as health threats, the health problems due to socio-economic status 
(SES) factors do not disappear.  The level of inequality in a society itself 
can impose health burdens on the community.35  Comparing equally 
wealthy countries, health outcomes are superior in egalitarian societies 
compared to ones with steeper economic gradients.36  Yet our tax policies 
 
traveled, we reduced, in just one generation, the risk of motor vehicle fatality five-fold 
[through] road safety, advocacy for safer driving, and legal disincentives for unsafe 
driving”).  For a recent example of our subsidization of transportation technologies, 
including self-driving automobiles presumably with inadequate regard for health risk, see 
Jerry Hirsh, Elon Musk’s Growing Empire Is Fueled by $4.9 Billion in Government 
Subsidies, L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-hy-musk-
subsidies-20150531-story.html. 
 30  See, e.g., Scott Fields, The Fat of the Land: Do Agricultural Subsidies Foster Poor 
Health?, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A820, A821 (2004).  See generally David Wallinga, 
Agricultural Policy and Childhood Obesity: A Food Systems and Public Health 
Commentary, 29 HEALTH AFF. 405 (2010). 
 31  Karina Christiansen, Franchising Inequality, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1141, 1141 (2017) 
(reviewing CHIN JOU, SUPERSIZING URBAN AMERICA: HOW INNER CITIES GOT FAST FOOD 
WITH GOVERNMENT HELP (2017)).  
 32  Alan Ehrenhalt, The Grocery Gap, GOVERNING (April 2006), http://www.governing. 
com/topics/mgmt/Grocery-Gap.html. 
 33  See generally MICHAEL MARMOT, STATUS SYNDROME: HOW SOCIAL STANDINGS 
AFFECT OUR HEALTH AND LONGEVITY (2004); R.G. WILKINSON, UNHEALTHY SOCIETIES: THE 
AFFLICTIONS OF INEQUALITY (1996); R.G. WILKINSON, MIND THE GAP: HIERARCHIES, 
HEALTH AND HUMAN EVOLUTION (2000); Angus Deaton, Health Inequality and Economic 
Development, 41 PRINCETON J. ECON. LIT. 113 (2001).  See also, Joshua Holland, High 
Inequality Results in More US Deaths than Tobacco, Car Crashes and Guns Combined, 
MOYERS & CO. (Apr. 19, 2014), http://billmoyers.com/2014/04/19/high-inequality-results-
in-more-us-deaths-than-tobacco-car-crashes-and-guns-combined/#.VY1GJPrs9dk.twitter. 
 34  See generally NORM DANIELS ET AL., IS INEQUALITY BAD FOR OUR HEALTH? (2001). 
 35  NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 83–87 (2008). 
 36  RICHARD WILKINSON, MIND THE GAP: HIERARCHIES, HEALTH AND HUMAN 
EVOLUTION (2000).  See also MARMOT, supra note 33; Kate Pickett & Richard Wilkinson, 
Income Inequality and Health: A Causal Review, 128 SOC. SCI. & MED. 316 (2015); NANCY 
E. ADLER ET AL., REACHING FOR A HEALTHIER LIFE: FACTS ON SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND 
HEALTH IN THE U.S. (2008), http://www.macses.ucsf.edu/downloads/reaching_for_a_healthi 
er_life.pdf.  
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are ever more unequal with predictable health impacts.37  For instance, 
every ten percent reduction in the Earned Income Tax Credit increases 
infant mortality by 23.2 per 100,000 births.38 
Education is arguably the SES factor most profoundly correlated with 
health outcomes.  Globally, educational status, especially that of the 
mother,39 as well as literacy, particularly male-female disparity in adult 
literacy, are among the strongest predictors of life-expectancy.40  
Meanwhile our system leaves far too many behind as the fashioning of 
choice or charter policies and diversion of funding to private schools 
reinforce disparity in educational opportunity.41 
Meanwhile, incarceration policies harm prisoner health in lasting 
ways, not to mention their effect on the children of incarcerated parents, 
and even on the health of those who merely live in communities with “toxic 
exposure” to mass incarceration.42 
As yet uncertain-health threats lurk in other non-health sector policies.  
For instance, special immunities granted to social media platforms 
 
 37  See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TJCA), Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 
(2017).  See William Gale et al., A Preliminary Assessment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 
2017, 71 NAT’L TAX J. 589 (2018) (assessing the TJCA and concluding that its effect would 
be to make the distribution of after-tax income less equal). 
 38  See Peter A. Muennig et al., Cost Effectiveness of the Earned Income Tax Credit as a 
Health Policy Investment, 51 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 874, 874–881 (2016).  See also 
William H. Dow et al., A Way Out from Rock Bottom: Economic Policies Can Reduce 
Deaths of Despair, VOX CEPR POLICY PORTAL (July 7, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/eco 
nomic-policies-can-reduce-deaths-despair.  
 39  See Emmanuela Gakidou et al., Increased Educational Attainment and Its Effect on 
Child Mortality in 175 Countries Between 1970 and 2009: A Systematic Analysis, 376 
LANCET 959, 959 (2010). 
 40  See DANIELS, supra note 35, at 88. 
 41  Dana Goldman & James P. Smith, The Increasing Value of Education to Health, 72 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1728, 1728 (2011); Stuart J. Olshansky et al., Differences in Life 
Expectancy Due to Race and Educational Differences Are Widening, and Many May Not 
Catch Up, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1803, 1803–04 (2012).  See also Bruce D. Baker, Exploring the 
Consequences of Charter School Expansion in U.S. Cities, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 30, 
2016), http://www.epi.org/publication/exploring-the-consequences-of-charter-school-expans 
ion-in-u-s-cities/#_ref14. 
 42  See ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: AN EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS 
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2013) (describing in Chapter 8 the effects of the “toxic 
exposure” to mass incarceration on individuals and their communities”); Mark L. 
Hatzenbuehler et al., The Collateral Damage of Mass Incarceration: Risk of Psychiatric 
Morbidity Among Nonincarcerated Residents of High-Incarceration Neighborhoods, 105 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 138, 138 (2015); Christopher Wildeman, Imprisonment and (Inequality 
in) Population Health, 41 SOC. SCI. RES. 74, 74 (2012) (showing that parental incarceration 
substantially increases infant mortality risk); Ingrid A. Binswanger et al., Epidemiology of 
Infectious Disease-Related Death After Release from Prison, Washington State, United 
States, and Queensland, Australia: A Cohort Study, 131 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 574, 574 
(2016),  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4937119/; @brujacontumbao, 
TWITTER (Jul. 5, 2019), https://twitter.com/brujacontumbao/status/1147238292448075777. 
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subsidize them at the expense of young people who face more mental 
health risks, particularly if they are vulnerable because of gender, sexual 
identity, or other characteristics.43  Whole literatures exist to examine the 
relationship between global trade and human development.44  Indeed, large-
scale ideologically clustered policies, such as neoliberalism itself, have 
been interrogated for their role in population health and the wave of so-
called “deaths of despair.”45 
A structured regime of HIAs would provide a way to frame some of 
these arguments in the language of a procedural right.  We already in some 
contexts and in some states, provide that when non-health laws are 
deliberated, people are entitled to demand an accounting of the associated 
health burden and a justification of the attendant suffering.46 
When trade agreements and economic legislation affect health, as they 
have by fostering the global spread of tobacco, why are the trade 
proponents exempt from proving that there is no less health-restrictive 
alternative?47  After all, nations that impose sanitary and phytosanitary 
policies must justify them as the least-trade-restrictive.48  Health should be 
accommodated when laws grant government monopolies that raise the 
price of drugs, and indeed there are scattered but underutilized provisions 
for public health-based exceptions from government-granted exclusivities 
to inventions and plant varieties.49  In theory, health rights could also trim 
back federal grants of liability relief to gun manufacturers.50 
 
 43  See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018) (providing liability relief to internet platforms).  See also 
David D. Luxton et al., Social Media and Suicide: A Public Health Perspective, 102 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH S195, S195 (2012); Rae Ellen Bichell, Suicide Rates Climb in U.S., Especially 
Among Adolescent Girls, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/he 
alth-shots/2016/04/22/474888854/suicide-rates-climb-in-u-s-especially-among-adolescent-
girls.  
 44  See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
 45  Ted Schrecker, Neoliberalism and Health: The Linkages and the Dangers, 10 SOC. 
COMPASS 952, 952–71 (2016).  See also AUDREY CHAPMAN, GLOBAL HEALTH, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND THE CHALLENGE OF NEOLIBERAL POLICIES (2016). 
 46  See infra text accompanying notes 82–88. 
 47  See, e.g., BENN MCGRADY, TRADE AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE WTO, TOBACCO, 
ALCOHOL, AND DIET (2011).  
 48  See Benn McGrady & Christina S. Ho, Identifying Gaps in International Food Safety 
Regulations, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183, 190 (2011).  
 49  7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2018); 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2018).  See 
also 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2018) (allowing compulsory licenses for devices for reducing air 
pollution); WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., EXCLUSIONS FROM PATENTABILITY AND EXCEPTIONS 
AND LIMITATIONS TO PATENTEES’ RIGHTS 2 (2015), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/e 
n/scp_15/scp_15_3-annex1.pdf.  
 50  15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2018).  See also Charles E. Koop & George Lundberg, 
Violence in America: A Public Health Emergency Time to Bite the Bullet Back, 267 JAMA 
3075 (1992).  See also ROBIN WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS 
OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003) (describing a case where a 
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Others have made more comprehensive cases for the “Health in All 
Policies” approach.  The evidence continues to mount, and I cannot do it 
justice here.  My case for HIAs is different; I aim to show that without 
HIAs, our current regime of regulatory analysis privileges competing non-
health values using rights-grammar in a way that has long gone unobserved 
and unexplained.  HIAs must be institutionalized in order to level the 
playing field.  These other purposes compete with and burden health and 
we need some means of checking them.  There are human costs to the 
unfettered pursuit of human welfare and development narrowly construed 
as consumption, production, and trade.51  HIAs supply a way of making 
these arguments so that government action advancing neoliberal interests at 
the expense of the populace can be blocked or mitigated. 
B. HIA as a Negative Right 
Use of HIA to call for an accounting of such government policies 
would not be a right to affirmative provision, but a claim of freedom from 
these health-harming measures.  The claim contrasts with the approach of 
some libertarian scholars who conceptualize the negative right to health as 
a freedom from government restriction of choice in medical treatment.52  
This narrower medical autonomy right would disfavor mandatory 
vaccination and possibly invalidate FDA pre-market drug approval 
requirements.53  This is a blinkered, and not necessarily health-promoting 
view of the government’s role in health, as Jennifer Prah Ruger and others 
have lamented.54  My project aims to show that a negative right to health 
properly conceived in the form of an HIA regime would meaningfully 
address some of the major health challenges we confront today. 
 
 
Texas district court judge held that a man’s constitutional right to bear arms trumps the 
public safety policy encoded in by a federal law forbidding domestic violence offenders 
from owning firearms) (citing United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 
1999), rev’d and remanded 270 F.3d 203, 261–63 (5th Cir. 2001) (reversed on the basis that 
though the federal law protecting public safety did not protect a right, it was sufficiently 
narrowly drawn to co-exist with the right to firearms)). 
 51  See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., FOR GOOD MEASURE: 
ADVANCING RESEARCH ON WELL-BEING METRICS BEYOND GDP (Joseph E. Stiglitz et al. 
eds., 2018), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307278-en. 
 52  See e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 
2210–11 (2011); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Safeguarding the Safeguards: The ACA Litigation 
and the Extension of Indirect Protection to Nonfundamental Liberties, 64 FLA. L. REV. 639 
(2012); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and 
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2007).   
 53  See Volokh, supra note 52, at 1816.   
 54  Jennifer Prah Ruger, Governing Health, 121 HARV. L. REV. F. 43 (2017) (responding 
to Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment 
for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007)). 
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A caveat first: the divide between positive and negative rights is 
overdrawn, and I would rather not reinforce it here.  We live in such a 
complex world, and there is almost nothing about our current set of 
conditions that is not a function of some kind of state action.55  Therefore, it 
is possible to characterize any action either as a demand to be free from 
state action of one particular kind, or as a demand for state action or 
forbearance of another.56  Our existing economic rights are not negative 
rights exactly: they are decisions to assure government backing for certain 
economic holdings.57 
To the degree that such artificial divisions between positive and 
negative rights are still used to police the boundaries of U.S. rights 
discourse, however, I am arguing that a right to health in the form of a right 
to HIA falls well within these boundaries. 
C. What is a Health Impact Assessment? 
HIA has been defined as “a combination of procedures, methods, and 
tools by which a policy, program, or project may be judged as to its 
potential effects on the health of a population, and the distribution of those 
effects within the population.”58  In short, the HIAs I propose would subject 
federal government action to a routine accounting of its impact on health 
and the distribution of health.59 
 
 55  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 17 (1997) 
(“Whether people have a preference for a commodity, a right, or anything else is in part a 
function of whether the government has allocated it to them in the first instance.  There is no 
way to avoid the task of initially allocating an entitlement (short of anarchy).”).  See also 
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. 
SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923). 
 56  SUNSTEIN, supra note 55, at 17; Hale, supra note 55, at 470.   
 57  See also BERNARD HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF A FREE MARKET: PUNISHMENT AND 
THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 47 (2010) (explaining, “In all markets, the state is present.  
Naturally, it is present when it fixes the price of a commodity such as wheat or bread.  But it 
is also present when it subsidizes the cultivation or production of wheat, when it grants a 
charter to the Chicago Board of Trade, when it permits trading of an instrument like a 
futures contract, when it protects the property interests of wheat wholesalers.”).  
 58  Andrew L. Dannenberg et al., Use of Health Impact Assessment in the U.S.: 27 Case 
Studies, 1999–2007, 34 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 241, 241 (2008) (citation omitted).  See 
also COMM. ON HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT ET AL., IMPROVING HEALTH IN THE UNITED 
STATES: THE ROLE OF HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT 5 (2011) [hereinafter “For the Public’s 
Health”] (defining HIA much as the Gothenburg paper, infra note 74, does, to mean “a 
systematic process that uses an array of data sources and analytic methods and considers 
input from stakeholders to determine the potential effects of a proposed policy, plan, 
program, or project on the health of a population and the distribution of those effects within 
the population.  HIA provides recommendations on monitoring and managing those 
effects.”).   
 59  In this article, I explore the policy of a federal HIA requirement, although, HIA 
requirements at state, transnational and other levels are also important steps forward. 
HO  (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2019  3:51 PM 
2020] LEGISLATING A NEGATIVE RIGHT TO HEALTH 655 
HIAs conventionally involve six stages: screening, scoping, 
assessment, recommendation, reporting, and finally, monitoring and 
evaluation.60  Sometimes called the Liverpool approach, the sequence of 
steps has been specified in the literature as follows: 
[A]pplying a screening procedure to select policies or projects 
for assessment; defining the scope of the health impact 
assessment in terms of depth, duration, spatial and temporal 
boundaries, methods, outputs, and the like; policy analysis; 
profiling the areas and communities likely to be affected by the 
policy; collecting qualitative and quantitative data on potential 
impacts from stakeholders and key informants, using a 
predefined model of determining health impact; evaluating the 
importance, scale, and likelihood (and, if possible, cost) of 
potential impacts; searching for the evidence to validate data; 
undertaking option appraisal (i.e., developing and choosing from 
alternative options) and developing recommendations for action; 
and monitoring and evaluating results following 
implementation.61 
HIA differs from some related tools.62  Risk assessments, for instance, are 
focused on discrete chemical exposure scenarios rather than the 
comprehensive consideration of a wider array of upstream health 
determinants.63  CBA includes less qualitative information than HIA, and 
HIA emphasizes a deliberative process, rather than an analytical approach, 
especially in the screening, scoping, assessment, and recommendation 
steps.64 
1. Link Between Health Impact Assessment and Equity 
Built into the conventional way HIA is conducted are a number of 
equity-promoting features, even leaving aside for the moment how equity 
may already be necessary to the project of population health.65  First, the 
 
 60  See For the Public’s Health, supra note 58, at 7. 
 61  Eileen O’Keefe & Alex Scott-Samuel, Human Rights and Wrongs: Could Health 
Impact Assessment Help?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 734, 734–35 (2002). 
 62  See, e.g., Different Types of Health Assessment, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION: HEALTHY PLACES, https://www.cdc.gov/healthyplaces/types_health_assessmen 
ts.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2016); Other Impact Assessments, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/hia/tools/other_IA/en/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
 63  JAMES G. HODGE, KIM WEDENAAR, & LEILA BARRAZA, THE NETWORK FOR PUB. 
HEALTH LAW, INTEGRATION OF HEALTH AND HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENTS VIA 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACTS 8 (2016), https://www.networkforphl.org/_asset/ltcwv8/PE 
W-HIA-NEPA-Stage-1—-Report-FINAL.pdf. 
 64  For the Public’s Health, supra note 58, at 127–28. 
 65  See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 35, at 85 (explaining that because the effect of SES 
factors on health is steeper for those who are worse off, therefore “transfers of resources 
from the best-off to the worst-off SES groups would improve aggregate health and would 
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identification of affected groups and communities is integral to the 
methodology, as is evident in the six stages described above.66  Also, HIAs 
are inseparable from assessments of health disparity.  HIAs by nature 
screen for differential impact, thereby necessarily identifying inequity.  
Moreover, an HIA detects disparities in baseline health in the process of 
measuring for differential impact and therefore involve health disparity 
impact assessment as well.  Furthermore, the analytical steps described 
above specifically call for the participation of stakeholders in contributing 
information or data to be deliberatively considered.67  Some observers have 
also argued that when non-health policies impose detrimental health 
burdens, those burdens “disproportionately affect[] the already 
disadvantaged”68 such that focusing on health impacts will tend to be 
equity-focused, rather than neutral to distribution.69 
There is also accumulating evidence, as discussed earlier, that 
inequality is a major determinant driving poor health outcomes, and 
therefore any measure that screens for detriment to health will tend to 
identify and capture policies that exacerbate inequality.70 
As is the case with all rights, however, this equity-promoting valence 
of HIAs can be disrupted or reversed.71  The National Research Council 
 
have little negative effect, if any, on the best-off groups”).  The implication is that 
improving population health, certainly doing so within a resource horizon, necessitates 
equity.  Moreover, inequality itself may negatively impact health outcomes.  See DANIELS, 
supra note 34.  For another view of how population health inherently contemplates health 
equity see David Kindig & Greg Stoddart, What Is Population Health?, 93 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 380, 380–81 (2003). 
 66  STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION WORKING GRP. OF THE 2010 HIA IN THE AMS. 
WORKSHOP, GUIDANCE AND BEST PRACTICES FOR STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN HEALTH 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT -VERSION 1.0- (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2012/0 
3/01/guidance_best_practices_stakeholder_participation_hia.pdf. 
 67  See supra text accompanying note 64. 
 68  See O’Keefe & Scott-Samuel, supra note 61, at 735.  
 69  Id.  See also Ray Quigley et al., Health Impact Assessment International Best 
Practice Principles: Special Publication Series Number 5, INT’L ASS’N FOR IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT: FARGO USA (2006), (on file with author) (outlining a set of values underlying 
HIAs).  But see For the Public’s Health, supra note 58, at 94.   
 70  Richard Wilkinson & Kate Pickett, The Science Is In: Greater Equality Makes 
Societies Healthier and Richer, EVONOMICS (Jan. 26, 2017), http://evonomics.com/wilkinso 
n-pickett-income-inequality-fix-economy/.  See also supra text accompanying notes 33–36. 
 71  See, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 
YALE L.J. 2188 (2013); Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the 
Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1589 (1984); Morton J. Horwitz, 
Rights, 23 HARV. C.R-C L. L. REV. 393, 396–97 (1988); Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of 
Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 182 (Wendy Brown & 
Janet Halley eds., 2002); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1364 
(1984); Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23, 26 (1993); Robin West, 
A Tale of Two Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 893, 893 (2014); Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The 
Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 713, 714 (2011); Peter 
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report is careful to note that the equity-favoring tilt of HIAs is a contingent 
and possibly temporary feature: “HIA could conceivably contribute to 
health inequities if more socioeconomically or politically advantaged 
communities develop greater capacity to demand HIA or if health issues 
that are highlighted in HIA are focused on the health needs of the 
advantaged.”72 
D. History and Precedent 
Some have sourced the HIA tool’s origins in the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Ottawa Charter on Health Promotion of 1986, which 
called for the “systematic assessment of the health impact of a rapidly 
changing environment—particularly in areas of technology, work, energy 
production, and urbanization.”73  WHO followed with a Gothenburg 
Consensus document on HIAs in 1999.74  In 2006, HIAs were 
recommended as standard in screening large World Bank projects and are 
now adopted by the Bank’s private sector counterpart, the International 
Finance Corporation.75  Their use has proliferated globally.  British 
Columbia and Quebec require HIAs for all government legislation.76  HIAs 
are included in the Thai constitution.77  The London mayor’s office 
construed HIAs as part of the office’s statutory remit for a number of 
years.78  Finland, Australia, New Zealand, Wales, and the European 
Community have to varying extents adopted HIA practices.79  WHO has 
 
Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of “Rights”, 33 UCLA L. REV. 977, 1003 (1986).  See also 
Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health 
Inequities?, 11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 33, 34 (2009).  See also Solomon R. Benatar, Human 
Rights in the Biotechnology Era, 2 BMC INT’L HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. 1, 3 (2002).  See 
also JONATHAN WOLFF, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 36–38 (2012). 
 72  For the Public’s Health, supra note 58, at 94. 
 73  WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE OTTAWA CHARTER FOR HEALTH PROMOTION (1986), 
https://www.who.int/healthpromotion/conferences/previous/ottawa/en/index1.html.  
 74  See generally EUR. CENTRE FOR HEALTH POL’Y & WHO REG’L OFF. FOR EUR., 
GOTHENBURG CONSENSUS PAPER: HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT MAIN CONCEPTS AND 
SUGGESTED APPROACH (1999), http://www.healthedpartners.org/ceu/hia/hia01/01_02_gothe 
nburg_paper_on_hia_1999.pdf.  
 75  Ben Harris-Roxas & Elizabeth Harris, Differing Forms, Differing Purposes: A 
Typology of Health Impact Assessment, 31 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 396, 396 
(2010).   
 76  For the Public’s Health, supra note 58, at 131.   
 77  Thailand’s Constitution of 2017, CONSTITUTE PROJECT § 58 (Aug. 13, 2019), 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Thailand_2017.pdf?lang=en. 
 78  J. Mindell et al., Health Impact Assessment as an Agent of Policy Change: Improving 
the Health Impacts of the Mayor of London’s Draft Transport Strategy, 58 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 
& COMTY. HEALTH 3, 169, 169–71 (2004), http://jech.bmj.com/content/58/3/169. 
 79  For the Public’s Health, supra note 58, at 15, 141, 144, 159, 162; LAURA GOTTLIEB 
& PAULA BRAVEMAN, HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A TOOL FOR PROMOTING HEALTH IN 
ALL POLICIES 6 (2011), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2011/rw 
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also promoted HIA methods in part through the WHO Healthy Cities 
European Network.80 
This practice is already in increasingly extensive, if sporadic, use in 
U.S states and localities.81  In one study, twenty-two of thirty-six sampled 
jurisdictions in the U.S. have made some legal provision for HIAs when 
environmental and energy policies are considered, while seven out of the 
thirty-six jurisdictions do so for agriculture or transportation policies.82  
HIAs are sometimes included as part of the environmental impact 
assessment required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
which I discuss in greater depth in Part II.C.  NEPA regulations include 
health among the “direct, indirect, and cumulative effects” of the proposed 
action and alternatives that must be considered in environmental impact 
reporting.83  While EPA can take health into account by using alternative 
tools, it has deliberately chosen the HIA methodology within its 
environmental assessments as part of its Sustainable and Healthy 
Communities Research Program.84  EPA concluded in its April 2014 
briefing paper that employment of the HIA methodology “helped raise 
awareness and bring health into decisions outside traditional health-related 
fields.”85  During Obama’s second term, Susan Bromm declared an EPA 
preference for HIAs over narrower risk assessments in the environmental 
impact reporting process because they capture the range of direct, indirect, 
 
jf70449. 
 80  Erica Ison, Health Impact Assessment in a Network of European Cities, 90 J.  URB. 
HEALTH 105, 105 (2013); Health Impact Assessment, WORLD HEALTH ORG. REG’L OFF. FOR 
EUR., http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/environment-and-health/urban-health/activit 
ies/health-impact-assessment (last visited October 24, 2019).  
 81  Dannenberg et al., supra note 58.  See also, JONATHON HELLER ET AL., PROMOTING 
EQUITY THROUGH THE PRACTICE OF HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT 8 (2013), 
https://kresge.org/sites/default/files/Promoting-equity-through-health-impact-assessment-
2013.pdf. 
 82  ALICIA CORBETT ET AL., LEGAL REVIEW CONCERNING THE USE OF HEALTH IMPACT 
ASSESSMENTS IN NON-HEALTH SECTORS 4 (2012), https://www.issuelab.org/resources/13060 
/13060.pdf.  See also Doug Farquhar, An Analysis of State Health Impact Assessment 
Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE ST. LEGISLATURES (July 17, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/res 
earch/environment-and-natural-resources/an-analysis-of-state-health-impact-assessment-
legislation635411896.aspx. 
 83  40 C.F.R. §1502.16 (2019); § 1508.7–8.   
 84  Memorandum from Susan E. Bromm & Michael Slimak to Regional NEPA 
Directors (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-3/documents/hia 
_memo_from_bromm.pdf [hereinafter Bromm & Slimak Memo].   
 85  SCIENCE IN ACTION: INNOVATIVE RESEARCH FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, OFF. RES. 
AND DEV., U.S. ENVTL.  PROT. AGENCY (2014) (on file with the author).  See also Jessica 
Wentz, Incorporating Public Health Assessments into Climate Change Action, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 403, 415 (Michael Burger & Justin Gundlach eds., 
2018). 
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and cumulative effects.86  For various reasons, however, including 
institutional insularity and gaps in research connecting policies to their 
ultimate health effects, this HIA mechanism remains underutilized, and 
health effects are not always identified in the environmental impact 
assessment process.87  Furthermore, NEPA-based health assessments 
cannot account for the health effects of many policies like tax measures 
that operate through economically or socially mediated pathways.88 
E. Model of a Right as a Privileged Distributed Interest Triggering 
Special Justification Duties 
So far, I have shown some ways to deploy HIAs, but I have not yet 
demonstrated my claim that HIAs are a form of a right to health.  Here, I 
use an account of rights as weighted or prioritized political norms with 
three features we would plausibly recognize as characteristic of rights. 
Rights are typically (though to varying extents) differentiated from 
“utilitarian goals” or “policy” values.”89  For instance, Ronald Dworkin 
observes that these non-rights values can be pursued in a cumulative way, 
and indeed frictionlessly traded-off against one another, while rights cannot 
be handled thus.90  By contrast, policies, unlike rights, can be pursued and 
maximized in the aggregate.91  Thus “policy goals” constitute a category of 
political norms that can be handled through CBA.92 
1. Individuation/Claiming 
A right, however, is a value that resists cumulative consideration.  
First, it requires some sort of individuation to be properly honored. 93  
“Goals” are advanced in any instance where they prevail such that if one 
person’s welfare suffers in any given transaction, another transaction can 
make up for that welfare loss.  The impairment of a right in one case (say 
the deprivation of a right to vote), however, is not rectified by giving 
someone two votes next time.  In Dworkin’s example, the protection of an 
 
 86  Bromm & Slimak Memo, supra note 84.   
 87  See HODGE, supra note 63, at 19–20. 
 88  See e.g., PUB. HEALTH ENG., PSYCHOSOCIAL PATHWAYS AND HEALTH OUTCOMES: 
INFORMING ACTION ON HEALTH INEQUALITIES 50 (2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/pu 
blications/psychosocial-pathways-and-health-outcomes.   
 89  For instance, there are those whose positions are more strictly grounded in the 
deontological tradition, and those who are on the more rule-utilitarian end of the spectrum.  
See e.g., Samaha, supra note 10, at 290. 
 90  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 91–92 (1978).   
 91  Id. at 91. 
 92  See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 1556.  See also Sidney Shapiro 
& Christopher Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 438 (2008).   
 93  DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 91(describing rights as an “individuated political aim”). 
HO (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2019  3:51 PM 
660 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:643 
individual’s liberty to purchase contraception does not mean that the next 
individual’s liberty can be violated because “enough sexual liberty” has 
been secured.94  No matter how much you serve the value that is a “right,” 
the value is still undermined if it is not recognized in any single case to 
which it applies.  This individuation follows from Dworkin’s imputation of 
principled integrity and consistency as features of rights.95 
Though the individuation of rights for Dworkin flows from his 
distinctive account, other scholars also insist upon the individuated aspect 
of rights, though grounded in their own outlooks.  Feinberg operationalizes 
this characteristic of rights in an even more demanding way, arguing that 
true rights must be able to be “claimed” by the rights-holder to distinguish 
them from duty-based obligations which may have incidental 
beneficiaries.96  This characteristic that rights can be claimed by the 
individual rights-holder is widely recognized, but dialed up or down in 
stringency based on the theory of rights. 
MacCormick describes the line between rights and duties as less a 
demarcation and more an adaptable continuum: 
There may indeed be simple cases in which some general duty—
e.g. a duty not to assault—is imposed upon everyone at large 
with a view to protecting the physical security of each and every 
person in society, and where the ‘right not to be assaulted’ is 
simply the correlative of the duty not to assault; no doubt in such 
simple cases the ‘terminology of rights’ does not enable us to say 
very much more than can be said in the terminology of duty.  But 
it may be well adapted even in this simple case to expressing a 
reason why people aggrieved by breaches of certain duties 
should be empowered to take various measures and actions at 
law to secure remedies therefore.97 
 
 
 94  DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 88. 
 95  See DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 81. 
 96  See e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE 
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 143, 154–55 (1980). 
 97  Donald. N. MacCormick, Rights in Legislation, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 189, 203–04 (Peter Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1979).  
See also, Donald N. MacCormick, Dworkin as a Pre-Benthamite, 87 PHIL. REV. 585, 599 
(1978) [hereinafter Pre-Benthamite] (on the difference between rights and duties: “When 
positive laws establish rights . . . what they do is secure individuals . . . in the enjoyment of 
some good or other.  But not by way of a collective good collectively enjoyed, like clean air 
in a city, but rather an individual good individually enjoyed by each, like the protection of 
each occupier’s particular environment as secured by the law of private nuisance.  Such 
protection is characteristically achieved by imposing duties on people at large, for example, 
not to bring about certain kinds of adverse changes to the environment of land or premises 
occupied by someone else, and further duties, which may be invoked at the instance of any 
aggrieved occupier, to make good damage arising from adverse environmental change.”). 
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Feinberg himself does not require that claimability necessarily include 
the ability to invoke judicial redress or even a legal rather than moral 
claim.98  Moreover, Raz cites examples, such as children’s rights (which 
children are often not empowered to raise) that belie the notion that “to 
have a legal right is to have control over its corresponding duty, i.e. to have 
legal powers to take protective legal action.”99 
Nevertheless, rights do need to be distinguished from general duties to 
the public at large and therefore in making the case for impact assessments 
as rights, we must prove that the obligations they impose can be described 
as distributed to some individual rights-holder, regardless of whether the 
rights-holder can always seek legal redress for violations. 
2. Privileged: Needing Special Justification to Overcome 
Presumption 
In addition to some claimability, however loosely or stringently 
construed, rights have other distinctive characteristics. 
In a rough way we might say for values to be rights, they must 
presumptively withstand compromise in favor of competing values.100  One 
must offer special justification surmounting the  presumption in order to 
harm a value that has the status of a right.101  By one account, rights are 
prioritized, or even ranked102 by means of “heavier weighting for principles 
concerning rights than for pure policies.”103  While MacCormick uses the 
term “weighting” to describe even Dworkin’s view of the priority of rights, 
Dworkin himself might have demurred.104  His prioritization of the right 
would permit the countervailing value to outweigh only (1) when “the 
values protected by the original right are not really at stake,” (2) “some 
competing right . . .  would be abridged,” or  (3) “the cost to society . . . 
would be of a degree far beyond the cost paid to grant the original right, a 
degree great enough to justify whatever assault on dignity or equality might 
be involved.”105  To the extent one could characterize this view of rights as 
 
 98  Feinberg, supra note 96, at 154. 
 99  Jospeh Raz, Legal Rights, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4, 19 (1984). 
 100  See DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 93 (making clear that background moral rights are 
not necessarily justiciable rights).  DWORKIN, supra note 90, at xi (describing rights as 
“political trumps held by individuals[,]” such that merely choosing to favor one interest is 
insufficient to justify an act promoting that interest, particularly if it comes at the expense of 
another kind of privileged interest). 
 101  DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 199. 
 102  DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 117. 
 103  See Pre-Benthamite, supra note 97, at 592. 
 104  Others have challenged whether Dworkin himself really adhered to this view.  See 
generally Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 
310 (2000). 
 105  DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 200. 
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a presumption that could be overcome by a weighty consideration, the 
consideration would have to be extremely weighty indeed. 
Others however, are not so strict.  Schauer characterizes values as 
rights if they, like armor, can resist “low justification” or “small bore” 
countervailing reasons, but not larger bore reasons for violation.106  Robert 
Alexy has formulated a theory that rights are subject to a form of weighted 
balancing.107  Nevertheless, certain structural features of a right are similar, 
even if the stringency of the standards to qualify under each property might 
vary with the theory of rights to which one subscribes. 
All accounts share the requirement of special justification to 
overcome a right, and that special justification is structured often as a 
“proportionality test.”  Alison Young explains why: 
[R]ights . . . rul[e] out some methods of balancing and giv[e] an 
element of additional weight to . . . rights in the balancing 
process . . . .  Proportionality is the best means of achieving this 
balancing because the test of proportionality is capable of 
assigning greater weight to . . . rights in the balancing exercise, 
and of restricting the range of justifications that can be used to 
restrict a . . . right.108 
David Beatty also concludes that “proportionality review is the 
‘ultimate’ rule of law for resolving constitutional questions about rights,”109 
and Aharon Barak claims, “[p]roportionality,  therefore, can be defined as 
the set of rules determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
limitation of a constitutionally protected right by a law to be 
constitutionally permissible.”110 
 
 106  Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 429 
(1993).   
 107  See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 388 (Julian Rivers trans., 
2002).  
 108  Alison L. Young, Proportionality Is Dead: Long Live Proportionality!, in 
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING 43, 47 (Grant 
Huscroft et al. eds., 2014). 
 109  Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Rights in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L. J. 
3094, 3094 n.1 (2015) (quoting DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159–188 
(2004)).   
 110  AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR 
LIMITATIONS 3 (2012).  He goes on to identify the “four sub-components of proportionality” 
under which “a limitation of a constitutionally protected right will be constitutionally 
permissible if:  
(i) it is designated for a proper purpose, (ii) the measures undertaken to 
effectuate such a limitation are rationally connected to the fulfillment of that 
purpose, (iii) the measures undertaken are necessary in that there are no 
alternative measures that may similarly achieve that same purpose with a 
lesser degree of limitation; and finally (iv) . . . a proper relation ( . . . or 
‘balancing’) between the importance of achieving the proper purpose and the 
social importance of preventing the limitation of the constitutional right. 
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It is therefore no surprise that the presumption-privileged tradeoff of a 
right in U.S. law figures commonly as a species of triggered proportionality 
test with pre-set weights.111  Our constitutional rights doctrine often 
requires (1) a showing of sufficiency of purpose, (2) means-ends 
rationality,  and (3) least-restrictive means.  I will refer to these last two 
inquiries under the umbrella term, “fit.”  The tradeoff must meet a fit 
threshold presumably because the right is so important that the 
infringement, indeed the entire extent of infringement, must be justified by 
the sufficiently weighty countervailing purpose, without excess.112  Many 
of these accounts of proportionality also add an explicit “balancing” prong, 
which I exclude here because it is implicit in the notion that the privileged 
value can be overcome by the decision-makers in this context.113 
3. Three Common Elements 
From the accounts summarized above, I distill a minimal set of 
common elements.  They are not the only ways to protect a right.114  These 
elements, if present, however, signal that a value is being treated as a right, 
particularly against the background of flat CBA by default, which 
predominates in the policy realm.115  We can be alerted to rights-reasoning 
at work whenever we see an interest whose trade-off requires a special 
showing of 1) sufficiency of purpose, 2) a special showing of fit, and 3) 




 111  See generally Jackson, supra note 109 (documenting how many tests for U.S. 
constitutional rights qualify as proportionality tests, with some exceptions such as in First 
Amendment doctrine concerning speech inciting violence, and Fourth Amendment law).  
See also Richard Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1316–1317 
(2008). 
 112  See ALEXY, supra note 107, at 229, 395–97, 399 (subdividing the “fit” prong into 
“suitability” and “necessity” inquiries, while excluding the “purpose” or “ends-test” as a 
necessary step, but separate from proportionality analysis, which he maintains is neutral as 
to ends). 
 113  See Jackson, supra note 109, at 3118–19, 3140–41, 3141 n.222 (describing how in 
the U.S. we assimilate the balancing step to the “less restrictive means” prong.  The elision 
lies in how courts will demand a less restrictive means, but fail to say whether the alternate 
means would be “equally effective in carrying out the government’s legitimately relevant 
interests, or instead that even if the [means] were less effective, [it] would be a sufficient 
alternative given the relatively greater importance of [the right intruded upon.”).  Jackson, 
supra note 109, at 3118–19.  
 114  See Jackson, supra note 109, at 3094 (discussing other methods in the U.S. 
constitutional tradition, like categorical rules).  See also BARAK, supra note 110, at 493–527 
(discussing methods like categorization or absolute rights, particularly as applied to a right’s 
“core”).  
 115  See supra text accompanying notes 5–7.   
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II. RIGHTS IN REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
STATUTES 
Fundamental rights under U.S. substantive due process doctrine 
receive strict scrutiny, as do certain First Amendment rights.116  Vicki 
Jackson has pointed out other areas of U.S. constitutional law, like Takings 
doctrine, where proportionality is used.117  Fallon describes how strict 
scrutiny in the form of “compelling interest” and “narrow tailoring” 
requirements arose to privilege certain constitutional rights over other 
constitutional values in the decades after the Lochner-era, when courts 
were trying to both a) correct for a lopsided solicitude for economic 
libertarian concerns (as I claim exists now in RIA domain) and b) render 
meaningful the protection of some rights even amid an overall acceptance 
of policy-tradeoffs (which the current vogue for CBA represents as well).118 
Few proceed to note, however, that RIA requirements are also rife 
with this three-part logic of heightened justification. 
The scholarly attention in this erstwhile backwater of administrative 
law has focused mostly on CBA and its critiques, chief among which is the 
methodology’s insensitivity to non-fungible, non-utilitarian values.119  But 
it turns out that CBA is not the only kind of regulatory analysis that must 
be routinely conducted.  We have accrued a list of special burdens that 
trigger their own procedural requirements and even substantive judicial 
review.  These RIA measures include the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) as amended by the Small Business 
Enforcement Regulatory Flexibility Act (SBERFA), the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), and the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA). 
Apart from these widely recognized RIAs,120 my inventory includes a 
number of less-canonical provisions that are similar in structure.  The 
Endangered Species Act permits burdens to biodiversity only under strict 
conditions including those of fit and purpose.  The Family Impact 
Assessment, which applied for a few years in the late 1990’s, arguably 
qualifies even though it was passed as a rider to an appropriations bill.  
Some Executive Orders (EO’s) even resemble these rights-like RIAs, 
despite the lack of judicial enforcement available for EO’s.121  For instance, 
 
 116  See Fallon, supra note 111, at 1316–17.  
 117  See Jackson, supra note 109, at 3104–05.  
 118  See Fallon, supra note 111, at 1270. 
 119  See supra note 9. 
 120  MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RES. SERV., COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN 
THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 2–15 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44813.pdf (including 
these four in the discussion).   
 121  See PETER STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASE AND 
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the Reagan-era EO 12630 (1988) required special assessment of regulatory 
burdens on private property even when the scrutinized regulations did not 
rise to the level of regulatory takings. 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), passed in 1993, is 
analogous because independently of the Constitution, it singles out certain 
burdens as triggering heightened justification involving showings of fit and 
purpose for valid regulatory or legislative action.  The chief difference 
between RFRA and the classic RIA is that such showings can be enforced 
by the mechanism of judicial review.  We shall, however, see that in the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act, NEPA, Title II of UMRA, and the Endangered 
Species Act, judicial review is available as well.122 
I argue that in each of these examples, we have elected to impose a 
heightened justification requirement that has the structure of a right, 
exhibiting three key elements 1) requiring sufficiency of purpose, 2) 
demanding careful fit, and 3) conferring some degree of claim to 
enforcement.  Claimability may not rise to full judicial recourse but may 
simply mean that individual beneficiaries have some procedural avenue for 
demanding the promised justification such that they are plausibly 
considered rights-holders as distinct from incidental beneficiaries. 
Not all RIAs are rights-like, and some fall outside my model, as I 
explain later.123  First, certain RIAs exhibit no vision of specific claimants.  
They therefore resemble duties to the public-at-large far more than 
rights.124  Single-sector impact assessments also fall outside the model.125  I  
discuss later why these impact assessments, which do not privilege the 
value against all competing values, are also excluded from my catalog of 
rights-like RIAs.126 
For those examples that I contend do fall within the domain of rights-
like impact assessments, I will demonstrate that each of the three rights-
distinguishing elements is present, although to varying degrees. 
A. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) 
I start by examining the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 
§3501 et seq.  This legislation prohibits regulatory action that imposes 
information collection without a procedural review of the paperwork 
burden.  The procedural review required under the PRA must be cleared 
through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the Executive 
 
COMMENTS 173–76, 213–29 (11th ed. 2011).  See also, infra text accompanying note 327. 
 122  See infra Part III.F and III.G. 
 123  See infra Part III.F and III.G. 
 124  See infra Part III.F and accompanying notes 349–352. 
 125  See infra Part III.G and accompanying notes 353–357. 
 126  See infra Part III.G and accompanying notes 353–357. 
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Office of the President. 
Moreover, PRA, like many RIA measures, advances important hidden 
purposes that are not reflected in the outward-facing title of the measure.  
For instance, the PRA accomplishes the important task of authorizing the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA) within the OMB.  
This entity, which serves as a clearinghouse for regulations and certain 
other administrative actions, has roots in a deregulatory agenda.127  
Whether it retains this cast today is in some dispute,128 but the creation of 
the OIRA, if nothing else, centralizes the Administration’s control over 
regulations, a policy goal that does not necessarily coincide with paperwork 
reduction.  As we will see, hidden policy goals are a common feature 
among the measures instituting RIAs. 
1. Scope 
Each of the RIAs I examine demands additional procedure and 
heightened justification beyond background cost-benefit judgments.  To 
differentiate the especially encumbered actions from background 
governmental action, we need some standard to determine when the 
heightened scrutiny applies.  The RIA procedures are only triggered based 
on whether there is some threshold burden to the chosen value.  The fact 
that RIAs emphasize their “impact assessment” function derives in part 
from the necessary assessment of threshold “impact” before the “right” of 
heightened justification is triggered.  Thus, I examine the threshold trigger, 
or scope of application, of each RIA. 
The PRA’s requirements are not triggered by paperwork, per se, but 
by regulatory action imposing “information collection.”  Information 
collection is defined in the regulations as “[t]he obtaining, causing to be 
obtained, soliciting, or requiring the disclosure to an agency, third parties 
or the public of information . . . imposed on, ten or more persons.” and 
 
 127  See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Lieb, Regleprudence at OIRA and Beyond, 
103 GEO. L. J. 259, 280, n.95, n.76 (2015) (describing Nixon’s deregulatory agenda as 
crucial in the history of regulatory review).  See also, Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: 
The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2011).  See also Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and 
Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1248 (1987) (recounting the origins of regulatory 
analysis in the Nixon, then Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations.).  
 128 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2281–2319 
(2001) (describing how the Clinton Administration used OMB and OIRA in a pro-
regulatory way, including through the use of “prompt letters” and other Presidential 
directives).  See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: 
Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013).  But see Lisa Heinzerling, Inside 
EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the 
Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 332 (2014) (discussing how the Obama 
White House used OIRA to block regulatory action).  
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“[i]ncludes any requirement or request for persons to obtain, maintain, 
retain, report, or publicly disclose information.”129  As we shall see, this 
information collection could well occur electronically, without imposing 
any “paperwork” at all, but such burden would still garner special 
scrutiny.130 
This condition upon agency information collection applies not only to 
Cabinet-level agencies but independent regulatory agencies as well.131 
The provisions of the PRA impose a presumption against this type of 
burden which must be surmounted by means of special justification 
corresponding to the three features of rights.132 
2. Sufficiency of Purpose 
Under 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c), “[E]ach agency shall . . . establish a 
process . . . to review each collection of information . . . for ‘an evaluation 
of the need for the collection of information.’”133  The need must be 
articulated in terms such as whether “the information has practical utility,” 
according to the certification requirement under § 3506(c)(3)(A), and the 
claim of “practical utility” must be subjected to public comment.134  Thus, a 
declaration of utility and need, or in other words, “sufficient purpose,” 
must be produced. 
3. Fit 
Meanwhile under 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2)(A) and (3)(A), the agency 
must “[E]valuate whether the proposed collection of information is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency.”135  
This requirement of necessity demands a level of means-ends fit between 
the action imposing the burden and the purpose which it is meant to serve. 
Section 3506(2)(A)(iv) tasks the agency with certifying whether it has 
“minimize[d] the burden of the collection of information on those who are 
to respond” ostensibly demanding the least-restrictive means. 
The fit requirement is even more rigorous should the paperwork 
burden fall on members of the special protectorate of small businesses.  
 
 129  5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c) (2019). 
 130  See infra text accompanying notes 152–159 (describing the E-Government Act of 
2002 which amended and supplemented the PRA). 
 131  CAREY, supra note 120, at 14–15 (saying that “independent agencies, as well as 
independent regulatory agencies” fall within the PRA’s coverage.  By contrast, Executive 
Orders, including those that impose default cost-benefit analysis requirements, do not 
always reach independent or independent regulatory agencies.). 
 132 See supra Part I. 
 133  44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A)(i) (2018); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.5(d)(1)(iii) (2019). 
 134  44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2)(A)(i). 
 135  Id. § 3506(c)(2)(A), (3)(A) (emphasis added); § 3506(c)(3)(A).   
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Section 3506(c)(3) obliges the agency not merely to “certify . . . that each 
collection of information . . . (C) reduces . . . the burden [of information 
collection] on persons . . . including with respect to small entities.”  It also 
proceeds to list specific mitigation measures for small businesses that could 
be used to achieve this “reduc[tion] to the extent practicable and 
appropriate,” such as different compliance standards, timetables, or 
exemptions.136  This additional specification increases the pressure for 
some kind of exemption or special treatment of small entities in the 
collection of information.  This apparatus further illustrates the hidden 
purposes and privileging of groups that may not be apparent from the 
outward framing of the RIA measure.137 
PRA contains a rather strict mechanism forcing lookback tailoring of 
even prior approved information collections.  Under §3507(g), the OMB 
Director “may not approve a collection of information for a period in 
excess of 3 years.”  Any extension would then require another process of 
review.  Meanwhile under § 3513, the OMB Director “shall periodically 
review selected agency information resource management activities,” thus 
serving as another channel of accountability for continual adjustment of fit 
and monitoring for continued sufficiency of purpose.138 
4. Claiming 
Under § 3508, the Director of OMB may provide “the agency and 
other interested persons an opportunity to be heard, or to submit statements 
in writing.”  This hearing provision serves as one way for beneficiaries to 
enlist someone, namely the OMB Director, to hold the agency to account 
for the PRA requirements.  Section 3508 admonishes that “[t]o the extent, 
if any, that the Director determines that the collection of information by an 
agency is unnecessary for any reason, the agency may not engage in the 
collection of information.”  The necessity determination, by the terms of § 
3508, “includ[es] whether the information shall have practical utility.”  
Thus, insufficient purpose or lack of means-ends rationality can be claimed 
by a rights-holder in a hearing to invalidate the measure imposing a 
paperwork burden. 
This OMB hearing provision admittedly employs the permissive term 
“may,” but another provision, § 3517(b) provides that “[a]ny person may 
request the Director to review any collection of information conducted by 
 
 136  Id. § 3506(c)(3)(C)(i)–(iii). 
 137  I will later suggest that one “hidden” or “complementary” purpose of HIAs is equity 
and will show how that can be built into the HIA.  See infra text accompanying notes 377. 
 138  I will also later suggest that lookback monitoring for continued justification should 
be built into HIAs so that existing arrangements can be subjected to HIA as well.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 391–395. 
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or for an agency to determine, if, under this subchapter, a person shall 
maintain, provide, or disclose the information to or for the agency.  Unless 
the request is frivolous, the Director shall . . . , respond to the request 
within 60 days . . . and take appropriate remedial action, if necessary.”139 
Moreover, persons can claim individualized immunities under § 3512, 
the “Public Protection” provision of the PRA.  The section stipulates that 
“[n]o person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a 
collection of information that is subject to this subchapter” if the agency 
has not received OMB approval of its compliance with the PRA in the form 
of a valid OMB control number.  Under § 3512(b), “[t]he protection 
provided by this section may be raised in the form of a complete defense, 
bar, or otherwise at any time during the agency administrative process or 
judicial action applicable thereto.”  The PRA implementing regulations 
apply this section to benefits conditional upon the information collection as 
well: “the agency shall not treat a person’s failure to comply, in and of 
itself, as grounds for withholding the benefit or imposing the penalty.  The 
agency shall instead permit respondents to prove or satisfy the legal 
conditions in any other reasonable manner.”140 
Apart from the normal administrative law requirement to take 
comments into account,141 the PRA statute insists under § 3507(d)(2) that 
in the final rule, an agency “shall explain how any collection of information 
contained in the final rule responds to the comments, if any, filed by the 
Director or the public, or the reasons such comments were rejected.”142 
Thus, the heightened justification requirement triggered by paperwork 
burdens is arguably held and enforceable by individual members of the 
public, rather than constituting a mere duty to uphold the collective good. 
5. History 
Freedom from paperwork was not a value suddenly elevated to this 
privileged status without prior groundwork.  It was originally recognized as 
a concern in the Federal Reports Act of 1942,143 but this legislation was 
criticized in the 1970’s as ineffectual, and was finally superseded by the 
PRA in 1980.144  Stuart Shapiro and Deanna Moran observe that the 
interest groups supporting the PRA were principally businesses and state 
 
 139  44 U.S.C. § 3517 (b)(1)–(2) (emphasis added).  See also 5 C.F.R. § 1320.14(c) 
(2019).  
 140  5 C.F.R. § 1320.6(c).  
 141  See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products, 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).  
 142  44 U.S.C. § 3507(d)(2).  
 143  Federal Reports Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-831, 56 Stat. 1078.  
 144  Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812. 
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and local governments.145  Meanwhile, the diffuse nature of the benefits 
from paperwork meant that no interest group came forward and supported 
its collection.146 
As Samaha notes, the PRA itself was followed by the Paperwork 
Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986,147 then further amended in the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,148 the Economic Growth and 
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996,149 the Government 
Paperwork Elimination Act of 1998,150 and the Small Business Paperwork 
Relief Act of 2002.151 
This history suggests that any of the RIAs that are not now easily 
classifiable as a form of subconstitutional “right” may still be a “right-in-
the-making.” 
Congress’ ongoing shaping of the PRA also injected additional or 
supplementary values into the right.  For instance, in 2002, Congress 
passed the E-government Act of 2002, which exists now as a statutory note 
to the provisions codifying the Paperwork Reduction Act.152  This note 
imposed a so-called “Privacy Impact Assessment” as an auxiliary to the 
PRA requirements, and indeed they are often completed together as one 
process.153  Section 208(b)(1)(A)(B) of the E-Government Act154 requires 
 
 145  See Stuart Shapiro & Deanna Moran, The Checkered History of Regulatory Reform 
Since the APA, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 161–62, 161 n.116, 162 n.124 (2016).  
 146  Id. at 161 n.113; see Tozzi, supra note 127, at 55 (President Carter himself signed 
the PRA over the objections of his Cabinet).   
 147  Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 
1783-335  (Title VIII, §§ 801–820 of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution). 
 148  Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163. 
 149  Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code). 
 150  Government Paperwork Elimination Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1701–10, 
112 Stat. 2681, 2749–51  (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3504 (2018)) (involving electronic 
submissions). 
 151  Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-198, 116 Stat. 729 
(codified in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.). 
 152  E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, Pub. L. No. 107-
347, 116 Stat. 2921; 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Waiver of Paperwork Reduction). 
 153  OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. PRESIDENT, M-03-22, OMB GUIDANCE FOR 
IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY PROVISIONS OF THE E-GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2002 Attachment 
A, § II(D) (2003) [hereinafter OMB Guidance Attachment A, § II(C)(2)], 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22/ (providing that agencies 
undertaking new electronic information collections may conduct and submit the privacy 
impact assessment [PIA] to OMB . . . jointly, and listing the items that must be then added 
for PIA purposes, such as “a statement detailing the impact the proposed collection will 
have on privacy” and “1. whether individuals are informed that providing the information is 
mandatory or voluntary[;] 2. opportunities to consent, if any, to sharing and submission of 
information[;] 3. how the information will be secured.”).   
Certain procedures are also triggered under the E-government Act when there are no 
“information collections” but simply upon procurement of an information system.  Because 
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that before “initiating a new collection of information that will be collected, 
maintained, or disseminated using information technology; and (II) 
includes any information in an identifiable form permitting . . . contacting 
of a specific individual . . . each agency shall . . . conduct a privacy impact 
assessment.”155 
The privacy impact assessment also consists of requirements to 
address sufficiency of purpose, i.e., “why the information is being 
collected” and its “intended use.”156  Fit is demanded in the form of a 
requirement to consider less-restrictive means, namely by addressing 
“opportunities to consent . . . to sharing and submission of information” 
and addressing “how the information will be secured.”157 
Also, to the extent that the electronic information collection results in 
the maintenance of a “system of records” with individually identifiable 
information,158 that system of records is then governed by another regime, 
the Privacy Act of 1974 which states, “[e]ach agency that maintains a 
system of records shall maintain in its records only such information about 
an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the 
agency required to be accomplished by statute or by executive order.”159 
The value of liberty from government-imposed paperwork is thus 
elided with the value of privacy. 
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) as amended by the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (“SBREFA”)160 
The RFA, like the PRA, was modified by Congress, most notably by 
the SBREFA in 1996.  The RFA enshrines a different favored value, 
namely small business freedom from economic burden.  An agency 
imposing such a burden must make a special showing of heightened 
justification, and this justification is expressly subject to judicial review. 
 
here I am interested in impact assessments that apply across a range of agency policy-
making activity, not just, for instance, building IT systems, I de-emphasize the procurement-
related impact assessment in this discussion and focus on the privacy impact assessment 
triggered by information collection. 
 154  E-Government Act § 208 (b)(1)(A)(ii)–(B)(i).  
 155  Id. 
 156  E-Government Act § 208 (b)(2)(B)(ii)(II)–(III); 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (Waiver of 
Paperwork Reduction). 
 157  E-Government Act § 208(b)(2); 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note.  See also OMB Guidance 
Attachment A, § II(C)(2), supra note 153. 
 158  5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (4)–(5) (2018) (defining “system of records” and “record”). 
 159  Id. § 552a(e)(1). 
 160  Id. §§ 601–612. 
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1. Scope 
The RFA, like the PRA, applies to independent regulatory agencies as 
well.161  For the justification requirements to attach though, a rule must 
reach the threshold of having a “significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.”162  Because these terms are malleable, 
an agency head must certify if she finds that a rule does not meet those 
standards and is therefore not subject to the analysis requirements.163  As 
discussed infra, this certification, which must be accompanied by a 
statement of factual basis, is subject to judicial review.164 
Small entities are defined to include small businesses, small 
nonprofits, and “small government jurisdictions.”165 
The RFA also applies to “interpretative rules” of the IRS, so long as 
they are published in the Federal Register, and “only to the extent that such 
interpretative rules impose on small entities a collection of information 
requirement.”166  The concerns of the PRA and the RFA intertwine once 
more, suggesting that many of these RIAs are part of an interconnected 
agenda. 
2. Sufficiency of Purpose 
The initial regulatory analysis that must accompany the proposed rule 
is called the initial “reg-flex.”167  In it, an agency must describe “reasons 
why action by the agency is being considered.”168  The agency must also 
supply “a statement of the need for, and objectives of, the rule.”169  These 
showings must be made above and beyond the mere statement of the 
“impact of the rule on small entities,” to which the required analysis 
presumably could have been restricted and still have constituted a 
“regulatory impact analysis.” 
3. Fit 
The initial reg-flex must also describe “any significant alternatives to 
the proposed rule which accomplish the stated objectives . . . and which 
minimize any significant economic impact of the proposed rule on small 
 
 161  CAREY, supra note 120, at 13.   
 162  5 U.S.C. § 605(b). 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. § 611(a)(2). 
 165  Id. § 601(3)–(6). 
 166  Id. § 603(a).  See also Thomas O. Sargentich, The Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 123, 128 (1997). 
 167  Richard J Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory 
Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 546 (1998). 
 168  5 U.S.C. § 603(b)(1). 
 169  Id. § 604(a)(1).  See also id. § 603(b)(2).  
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entities.170  The statute then lists particular alternatives that should be 
discussed including, “differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables,” “clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance,” 
“use of performance rather than design standards” and “exemption.”171  
Agencies are therefore subject to a fairly stringent least-restrictive means 
analysis.  When the final rule is promulgated, each final “reg-flex” must 
also include: 
[A] description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the 
significant economic impact on small entities . . . including a 
statement of the . . . reasons for selecting the alternative 
adopted . . . and why each one of the other significant 
alternatives to the rule . . . was rejected.172 
The measure also imposes a lookback requirement.  Each agency must 
review its rules every ten years to see if they fall within the scope of the 
RFA and whether they must be changed or rescinded “to minimize any 
significant economic impact of the rules upon a substantial number of such 
small entities.”173 
4. Claiming 
Small businesses must be notified so they have an opportunity to 
comment, and § 604(a)(2) requires that the final reg-flex contain a 
summary of comments and responses to those comments. 
Initially, RFA did not separately authorize judicial review of agencies’ 
actions.  Courts, however, would consider the contents of the reg-flex 
analysis in determining whether the rule was “arbitrary and capricious” 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)174  SBREFA, passed by the 
Gingrich Congress in 1996,175 added a judicial review provision.  Small 
entities can now go to court to challenge an agency’s actual analysis of 
final rules, an agency’s threshold certification of no significant impact, and 
the agency’s ten-year lookback review outcomes.176  Relief can include a 
deferment of enforcement against small entities, which is considerably 
more favorable than the usual remand nonvacatur which leaves the 
contested rule in place while the agency reconsiders the rule on remand.177  
 
 170  Id. § 603(c). 
 171  Id. § 603(c)(1)–(4). 
 172  Id. § 604(a)(6). 
 173  Id. § 610. 
 174  See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 187–88 (6th Cir. 1986).  
 175  See Shapiro & Moran, supra note 145, at 142, 172. 
 176  5 U.S.C. § 611(a)(2) (giving jurisdiction “to review any claims of noncompliance 
with §§ 601, 604, 605(b), 608(b) and 610”). 
 177  See Pierce, supra note 167, at 547–48. 
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SBREFA also authorizes small entities to recover attorneys’ fees,178 and 
stipulates a right of intervention for the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 
Small Business Administration in any such action.179 
The Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration acts as a representative for small businesses, and is 
someone the agency promulgating the rule must also reach out to at key 
points.180  With respect to three particularly villainized agencies, EPA, 
OSHA, and now CFPB,181 the advocacy role of the Chief Counsel is 
enlarged.  She must convene a review panel for each EPA, OSHA, or 
CFPB rule,182 comprised of governmental officials and tasked with 
consulting with individual representatives of affected small entities183 to 
review the initial reg-flex and proposed rule.184  The language stipulates 
that “where appropriate, the agency shall modify the proposed rule, the 
initial regulatory flexibility analysis or the decision on whether an initial 
regulatory flexibility analysis is required.”185  This structure of 
representative accountability exists alongside the canonically rights-based 
framework of judicial review. 
5. History 
The RFA was enacted in 1980, itself a deregulatory moment.186  Then 
in 1996, it was, as described, substantially amended to further favor small 
businesses.187  The political significance of SBREFA’s passage in 1996 
extends beyond small business, gesturing toward the entire political agenda 
of the anti-regulatory Gingrich-led Republican Revolution.  A crucial part 
of the agenda of the new Republican majority in that highly charged time 
was regulatory reform,188 including measures that would have codified the 
 
 178   Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121 
§ 231, 110 Stat. 857, 862–63 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)). 
 179  5 U.S.C. § 612. 
 180  See, e.g., id. § 605(b) (notifying Chief Counsel of any certification of lack of 
“significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities”); id. § 603(a) 
(requiring transmittal of initial reg-flex to the Chief Counsel). 
 181  Id. § 609(b) (applying additional requirements for initial reg-flex by “covered 
agencies”); id. § 609(d) (defining covered agency). 
 182  Id. § 609(b)(2)–(3). 
 183  Id. § 609(b)(2). 
 184  Id. § 609(b)(4). 
 185  5 U.S.C. § 609(b)(6). 
 186  See Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE 
L.J. 213 (1982). 
 187  Regulatory Flexibility Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 864 (1996). 
 188  See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN 
THE U.S. CONGRESS 110 (1997).   
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default requirement of CBA.189  Indeed, this particular idea, sometimes 
referred to as “the supermandate,” lingers to the present-day.190  Despite the 
significant political energy that the Gingrich Congress expended, their 
omnibus regulatory reform bills were unable to overcome the opposition of 
Democrats, including then-President Clinton.191  SBREFA was among the 
only pieces of the Republican agenda that did ultimately wend its way to 
completion. 
C. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)192 
NEPA is the godparent of all regulatory analysis requirements.193  
Passed in 1969 and signed by Richard Nixon on January 1, 1970, it requires 
agencies to “include in every recommendation or report on proposals for 
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement . . . on . . . the 
environmental impact of the proposed action.”194  In effect, it made 
“environmental protection a part of the mandate of every federal agency 
and department.”195 
1. Scope 
The condition of a detailed statement applies to “every 
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.”196 
“Significantly affecting” is not defined in the statute, but NEPA 
regulations contain a device for how to make this threshold determination.  
Agencies must conduct Environmental Assessments (EAs) which “briefly 
provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare 
 
 189  See also, Pierce supra note 167, at 546.   
 190  See e.g., Portman-Heitkamp Regulatory Accountability Act, S. 951, 115th Cong. § 
3(b)(5) (2017).  
 191  See SINCLAIR, supra note 188, at 110–13. 
 192  42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2018).  
 193  See McGarity, supra note 127, at 1247 (noting that “[t]he idea that agencies should 
prepare a separate regulatory analysis document describing the costs and benefits of 
proposed and final rules and credible rule-making alternatives probably originated with the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969”).   
 194  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) § 102(1)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 
4332(1)(C)(i).   
 195  CalvertCliff’s Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 196  42 U.S.C. § 4332(1)(C).  Lookback review might not be available in the sense that 
previously approved major federal actions do not continue to be subject to this procedural 
burden for continued effect, even if the environmental circumstances of those prior actions 
have changed.  See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004).  
HO (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2019  3:51 PM 
676 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:643 
an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact.”197  
Thus, some minimal environmental assessment is necessary in order to 
determine whether a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must be 
conducted.  The device of the “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI) is 
the flip-side of the EIS in the sense that if an EA concludes in a FONSI, 
then an EIS does not need to be conducted.198  Sometimes substantive 
environmental mitigation commitments are made at this stage to obtain 
what is called a “mitigated FONSI” and thereby avoid the EIS process.199  
EA’s and FONSI’s are also subject to judicial review.200 
2. Sufficiency of Purpose 
Unlike its RIA progeny, the NEPA statute does not require an analysis 
of sufficiency of purpose in so many words.  The regulations interpreting 
NEPA do, however.  A decision contrary to the most environmentally 
preferable alternative must be described in terms of the other “economic 
and technical considerations and agency statutory missions . . . including 
any essential considerations of national policy” that weighed against the 
environmentally preferable alternative.201  This language requires that the 
countervailing factors be weighty. 
3. Fit 
The NEPA statute does specifically demand a showing of fit.  The 
agency must articulate in its detailed statement under § 4332(1)(C) “any 
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal 
be implemented.”202  Moreover, it must describe “alternatives to the 
proposed action.”203  This language has been interpreted as a procedural 
requirement to consider, though not necessarily adopt, less environmentally 
damaging alternatives.204  The regulations interpreting NEPA, however, do 
require that the decisionmaker record the environmentally preferable 
alternative, and then describe how the agency decided against this 
alternative based on the weighty purposes described above.205 
 
 197  40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2019).   
 198  Id. § 1508.13. 
 199  Bradley Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 935 (2002). 
 200  See Save Our Ten Acres (SOTA) v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 201  40 C.F.R. § 1505.2. 
 202  National Environmental Protection Act § 202(1)(C)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1)(C)(ii) 
(2018). 
 203  Id. § 4332(1)(C)(iii). 
 204  See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 
558 (1978). 
 205  40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (requiring a “Record of Decision,” or “ROD”). 
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4. Claiming 
While NEPA did not include an express judicial review provision, 
courts have reviewed for NEPA compliance using APA § 702.206  Courts 
apply a “hard look” standard to judge an agency’s execution of its 
obligations under NEPA,207 and a regulation can be enjoined if the 
agency’s performance of these functions is so inadequate that the 
regulation is thereby  and capricious.208  Moreover, mitigation measures 
adopted as a condition of the FONSI are judicially enforceable.209 
5. History 
NEPA does not simply establish an impact assessment requirement.  
There are important non-obvious purposes hitched to NEPA as well.  The 
measure created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), within the 
Executive Office of the President (EOP), with duties to assist and advise 
the President on the quality of the environment across the various 
“programs and activities of the Federal Government.”210  NEPA created a 
Science Advisory Board which must be consulted on proposed criteria, 
standards, limitations, or regulations under a range of environmental 
statutory authorities.  These institution-building provisions in NEPA 
elevate environmental issues within the White House211 and subject 
environmental regulation to across-the-board involvement by the Science 
Advisory Board. 
NEPA has proven surprisingly enduring.  Congressional amendment 
has been fairly minor,212 although many new laws that Congress passes 
contain NEPA exemptions.213  CEQ promulgated binding NEPA 
regulations in the late 1970s, but on the authority of President Carter’s 
 
 206  See, e.g., Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1353–54 
(9th Cir. 1994) (where the justiciability of compliance with NEPA was conceded precisely 
on the question of whether the consideration of human health effects—albeit measured by 
methods other than HIA—were adequate to satisfy NEPA requirements). 
 207  See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen’s Council, 490 U.S. 332, 338 (1989); 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976). 
 208  See, e.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 106 
(1983); Coeur D’Alene Lake v. Kiebert, 790 F. Supp. 998, 1010 (D. Idaho 1992); see 
generally Nicholas C. Yost, The Background and History of NEPA, NEPA LITIG. GUIDE 
(Ferlo et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012). 
 209  Tyler v. Cisneros, 136 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 210  42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2018). 
 211  See Yost, supra note 108, at 1. 
 212  Bradley Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 336 n.14 (2004). 
 213  See, e.g., Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 205 n.9 (1998) (counting the 
number of exceptions to NEPA authorized by Congress by the year 1997, and finding 28); 
see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mimicry and Recruitment in 
Environmental Law, 20 ENVTL. L. 485, 496 (1990). 
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Executive Order 11,991, rather than on the basis of statutorily delegated 
rulemaking authority.214  These regulations have operated through the 
decades, despite being based on what one observer describes as “such a 
shaky legal foundation.”215  NEPA, which declares a Congressional policy 
of “recogniz[ing] that each person should enjoy a healthful 
environment,”216 has achieved a degree of entrenchment.  Indeed, one 
commentator notes, “If environmental law has a superstatute, it is the 
procedural NEPA,”217 referencing the notion that certain laws attain a status 
of popular acceptance and entrenchment such that they become durable 
normative fixtures exerting influence beyond ordinary legislation.218  
Indeed, this capsule history of NEPA supports the argument that RIAs are 
instruments of popular struggle to inscribe conceptions of rights in extra-
constitutional space. 
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)219 
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) was passed in 1995 
and imposes heightened scrutiny on the uncompensated economic burdens 
that subnational governments shoulder because of federal mandates.  A 
“federal intergovernmental mandate,” the target of UMRA, is defined as 
“any provision in legislation, statute, or regulation that would impose an 
enforceable duty upon State, local or tribal governments . . . or would 
reduce or eliminate the amount of authorization of appropriations for . . . 
the purpose of complying with any such previously imposed duty.”220  
What is notable about UMRA is that it applies to legislation.221  Title I of 
 
 214  Exec. Order No. 11,991 (“EO”), 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (2018).  The EO directs agencies 
to “comply with the regulations issued by [CEQ] except where such compliance would be 
inconsistent with statutory requirements.”  Id. § 2(g).   
 215  See Karkkainen, supra note 212, at 336.   
 216  National Environmental Protection Act § 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (2018).   
 217  See, e.g., Jedidiah Purdy, Coming into the Anthropocene, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1619, 
1619 (2016); see also Arthur W. Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the 
Licensing Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace?, 72 COLUM. 
L. REV. 963, 963 (1972) (describing NEPA as an “environmentalist Magna Carta”).   
 218  See generally ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2013). 
 219  Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) § 2, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2018) and 
scattered sections. 
 220  Id. § 658(5).  This definition is simplified for exposition purposes here.  The 
definition features certain economic thresholds as well, and a number of exclusions, 
including a complex partial exclusion of conditions on spending, which are differentiated 
from conditional provisions attached to entitlement programs.  Statutes imposing federal 
intergovernmental mandates trigger reporting requirements, but these are only enforceable 
above a certain economic threshold.  Id.  Also, in the process of bill passage, an amendment 
was added such that federal mandates upon the private sector (rather than just upon 
subnational governments) would also trigger scrutiny.  Id. § 658(6)–(7); see infra note 269. 
 221  See Unfunded Mandate Reform Act § 202, 2 U.S.C. § 1532. 
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the Act addresses legislative action, and Title II concerns regulatory action.  
I discuss Title II first, and then return to Title I. 
1. Regulatory Sufficiency of Purpose 
Title II applies to proposed rulemaking “likely to result in 
promulgation of any rule that includes any Federal mandate that may result 
in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, 
or the private sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for 
inflation) in any one year.”222 
Such actions must be accompanied by a § 202 written statement of 
“anticipated . . . benefits . . . as well as the effect of the Federal mandate on 
health, safety, and the natural environment,” or in other words, a statement 
of sufficient purpose.223  Health is anticipated to be a governmental purpose 
that can compete with and burden the favored value of state and local 
economic freedom. 
2. Regulatory Fit 
UMRA § 205 clearly states that “the agency shall identify and 
consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and from those 
alternatives select the . . . least burdensome alternative that achieves the 
objective of the rule.”224  This fit requirement permits the presumption 
against intergovernmental burden to be overcome only in two 
circumstances: first, with an explanation by the head of the relevant 
agency, or second, if these “provisions are inconsistent with law.”225 
3. Regulatory Claiming 
The agency must engage in “consultation with elected representatives 
of the affected State, local, and tribal governments”226 and the § 202 written 
statement must describe this consultation when the rule is promulgated.227  
Such written statement must also include a summary of comments with the 
agency’s responses.228  Again, this type of provision provides affected 
entities with some protected expectation of participation. 
In fact, this expectation turns out to be enforceable under UMRA § 
401(a).  According to that section, “compliance or noncompliance . . . with 
the [written statement] provisions of . . . [§] 202” are subject to judicial 
 
 222  Id. § 1532(a). 
 223  Id. § 1532(a)(2). 
 224  Id. § 1535(a). 
 225  Id. § 1535(b). 
 226  Id. § 1532. 
 227  Unfunded Mandate Reform Act § 202, 2 U.S.C. § 1532(b). 
 228  Id. §§ 1532(a)(5)(A)–(C). 
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review within 180 days of promulgation.  Though the “sufficiency of 
purpose” requirement is subject to judicial review, the fit requirements of § 
205 do not seem to be within the scope of this provision, since they are 
contained in § 205, rather than § 202.229  The review that is provided under 
this section is described as APA § 706(1) review, namely, review to 
“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”230  
Because any enforcement action would concern whether the agency 
complied with the statement requirement, the remedy could consist merely 
of judicial order that the agency prepare the statement.  By the terms of the 
judicial review provision itself, “inadequacy or failure to prepare such [a] 
statement . . . shall not be used as a basis for staying, enjoining, 
invalidating, or otherwise affecting such agency rule.”231  Moreover, a rule 
of construction tacked on at the end of the section disingenuously disclaims 
the creation of “any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,”232 
presumably weakening the strength of judicial enforcement available under 
the regulatory accountability provisions of UMRA. 
4. Legislative Sufficiency of Purpose 
I now return to the portion of UMRA that applies to legislative action.  
Under Title I, when a Congressional committee reports out legislation that 
includes “any Federal mandates,” the legislation must be accompanied by a 
reporting of not only costs anticipated in the first five fiscal years, but also 
the “benefits anticipated from the Federal mandates (including the effects 
on health and safety and the protection of the natural environment).”233  
Such a declaration of benefit could be understood as a requirement to state 
a sufficient purpose for the imposition of the federal mandate. 
What leaps out about this § 423(c) committee reporting duty is that no 
point of order is available to enforce this requirement.234  UMRA amended 
 
 229  Id. §§ 1571(a)(1)–(2), (5).  
 230  Id. 
 231  Id. § 1571(a)(3). 
 232  Id. § 1571(b)(2). 
 233  Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Congressional Budget 
Act) §§ 423(c)(1)–(2), (as amended by Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 
658d(c)(1)–(2) (2018)).  Congressional Budget Act § 423(c), 2 U.S.C. § 658c, assigns a duty 
to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to estimate the cost of federal mandates in 
proposed legislation. 
 234  Congressional Budget Act § 423(f) requirement for a CBO estimate to accompany 
the committee reported bill is protected by point of order.  Budget Act § 425(a)(1) says that 
“[i]t shall not be in order in the Senate or the House of Representatives to consider (1) any 
bill or joint resolution that is reported by a committee unless the committee has published a 
statement of the Director on the direct costs of Federal mandates in accordance with [section 
423(f)] before such consideration.”  2 U.S.C. § 658d(A)(1).  But this section does not 
mention the need to accord with § 423(c), which contains the other committee reporting 
requirements. 
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a two-decade old law, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974, often referred to as the “Congressional Budget Act of 1974.”  
UMRA inserted many of its requirements directly into the framework of 
the Congressional Budget Act.235  Indeed the section number used to 
signify this obligation, § 423, refers to the section of the Congressional 
Budget Act added by UMRA containing this committee reporting duty in 
subsection (c). 
As a general matter, Congress’ overall budgeting framework is 
enforced by an elaborate system of points of order.236  After all, for 
Congress’ budget to have meaning, it must impose consequences for the 
passage of laws that exceed the budget.237  The Congressional Budget Act 
thus subjects such budget non-conforming legislation to a point of order 
that any member of Congress can raise.238  To proceed with the legislation 
once such an objection has been raised, the relevant house must waive the 
implicated rule,239 a step which according to the Congressional Budget Act 
framework, requires a supermajority vote.240 
The UMRA committee reporting requirement under § 423, however, 
is not subject to a point of order.241  Even if it were, the regular committee 
process is increasingly a relic of the past as many bills in our hyper-
polarized political context are steered by leadership directly to the floor.242 
These circumstances do not mean that UMRA is unenforceable as 
applied to legislation.  UMRA contains a second tier of requirements apart 
from § 423.  Section 425 of the UMRA-amended Congressional Budget 
Act imposes an even stronger condition upon significant mandates 
exceeding an economic threshold (roughly $50 million in direct costs) and 
 
 235  Congressional Budget and Impoundment and Control Act of 1974 is often referred to 
as the “Congressional Budget Act of 1974,” 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–88.   
 236  Christina S. Ho, Budgeting on Autopilot: Do Sequestration and the Independent 
Payment Advisory Board Lock-In Status Quo Majority Advantage?, 50 TULSA L. REV. 695, 
716 (2015). 
 237  Id. at 716–17. 
 238  Congressional Budget Act §§ 302(f)(1)–(2); 2 U.S.C. §§ 633(f)(1)–(2). 
 239  Bill Heniff, Jr., Overview of the Authorization-Appropriations Process, CONG. RES. 
SERV. 1, 2 (2012), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/d2b1dc6f-4ed2-46ae-83ae-
1e13b3e24150.pdf.   
 240  While usually only a majority vote is required to override the ruling of a chair when 
such ruling is appealed to the whole Senate, some points of order under the budget process 
require 60 votes to waive.  2 U.S.C. § 621 note; see Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the 
Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 KAN. 
L. REV. 1113, 1174 (1997).  
 241  See UMRA § 425(a)(1), 2 U.S.C. § 658d(a)(1) (by contrast subjecting the CBO 
reporting requirement, as opposed to the committee reporting requirement, to a point of 
order). 
 242  Garrett, supra note 240, at 1142. 
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this condition, if not met, is vulnerable to a point of order.243  The point of 
order, unlike some others within the Congressional Budget Act, requires a 
mere majority to overcome.244  Various aspects of the § 425 condition are 
discussed below, but it requires, roughly speaking, some indication that the 
mandate’s burdens will be mitigated.245  While this point of order does not 
apply expressly to the absence of sufficient purpose for the mandate, one 
could view a vote to overcome the point of order as a legislative 
determination that the purpose of legislation containing the unfunded 
mandate is sufficient to overcome the presumption.246  Forcing a separate 
vote on this issue alone can be viewed as a requirement of extra clarity on 
the sufficiency of purpose to infringe on the favored value of states’ 
economic freedom.247 
5. Legislative Fit 
As we mentioned in discussing Title II of UMRA earlier, before 
promulgating a rule for which a written statement is required, “the agency 
shall . . . consider . . . [and] select the . . . least burdensome alternative.”248 
At first glance, the articulation of a similar fit requirement is not a 
condition for a legislative intergovernmental mandate, especially one 
protected by the less enforceable § 423(c) committee reporting obligation.  
This initial impression, however, gives way on closer inspection, as we 
describe later.249  Oddly, for a legislative private mandate, the committee 
report must include “a description of the actions, if any, taken by the 
committee to avoid any adverse impact on the private sector.”250  But this 
requirement does not apply to a legislative intergovernmental mandate.  
Like RFA, UMRA establishes a private protectorate whose economic 
interests are procedurally differentiated. 
Yet, the real enforcement cudgel, the point-of-order under § 425 of 
the Congressional Budget Act, applies only to intergovernmental 
 
 243  Congressional Budget Act § 425(a)(2) (as amended by UMRA), 2 U.S.C. § 
658d(a)(2). 
 244  Garrett, supra note 240, at 1161 (explaining that a majority vote is needed to sustain 
a ruling of the chair to overrule the point of order, or to appeal a ruling of the chair 
sustaining the point of order, or voting on the point of order even if the Chair has declined to 
rule).  Garrett, supra note 240, at 1162.  
 245  See Congressional Budget Act § 425(a), (B)(iii)(bb), 2 U.S.C. §§ 658d(a)(2), 
(B)(iii)(bb).  
 246  See Garrett, supra note 240, at 1165–66. 
 247  See generally William Eskridge & Philip Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992). 
 248  2 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (2018). 
 249  See Congressional Budget Act §§ 425(a)(2)(A), (B)(iii)(I)(bb), 2 U.S.C. §§ 
658d(a)(2)(A), (B)(iii)(I)(bb). 
 250  See Congressional Budget Act §§ 423(c)(3); 2 U.S.C. §§ 658b(3). 
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mandates.251  Despite a lack of specific language in Title I, close 
consideration reveals that fit requirements do apply to these $50 million-
plus intergovernmental mandates. 
The requirement is apparent once one realizes that by default the “less 
burdensome alternative,” or the means by which the mandate burden is to 
be minimized, is through federal funding.  UMRA certainly requires 
declaration of either funding or mandate mitigation for legislation to 
constitute a “funded” rather than “unfunded” mandate and thereby escape 
the point of order.  For instance, § 425(a)(2)(A) and (B) lists conditions 
exempting legislation from the point of order.  Subparagraph (A) exempts 
legislation if it provides new budget authority, entitlement, or spending 
authority to cover the mandate.252  Subparagraph (B) stipulates that the 
conditions necessary to avoid a point of order are satisfied if the bill 
authorizes sufficient appropriations, and provides some assurance that the 
amount will be appropriated.253  To meet this requirement, legislation could 
include a circuit-breaker that kicks in whenever appropriations fall short to 
“implement a less costly mandate or mak[e] such mandate ineffective for 
the fiscal year.”254 
Even when federal intergovernmental mandates miss the $50 million 
direct-costs threshold and are therefore not subject to § 425 and its 
accompanying point of order, the § 423 committee report must contain “a 
statement of whether the committee intends that the Federal 
intergovernmental mandates be partly or entirely unfunded, and if so, the 
reasons for that intention.”255 
Lookback review is built into UMRA.  If within ten years, the 
implementing agency re-estimates the mandate’s costs and they prove to be 
higher, the agency must notify Congress with recommendations for 
mitigation or lapse of the mandate’s burden.256  Garrett also notes, 
“Congress has the authority under the Act to request CBO to perform 
follow-up studies.”257 
6. Legislative Claiming 
The point of order provides accountability for the heightened 
legislative criteria of § 425, which can be understood as requirements for 
 
 251  See Congressional Budget Act § 425(a)(2), 2 U.S.C. § 658d(a)(2). 
 252  Congressional Budget Act §§ 425(a)(2)(A), (B)(iii)(I)(bb), 2 U.S.C. §§ 
658d(a)(2)(A), (B)(iii)(I)(bb). 
 253  Congressional Budget Act § 425(a)(2)(B), 2 U.S.C. § 658d(a)(2)(B). 
 254  Congressional Budget Act § 425(a)(2)(B)(iii)(I)(bb), 2 U.S.C. § 
658d(a)(2)(B)(iii)(I)(bb). 
 255  Congressional Budget Act § 423(d)(1)(B), 2 U.S.C. § 658b(d)(1)(B). 
 256  Congressional Budget Act § 425(a)(2)(B)(iii), 2 U.S.C. §§ 658d(a)(2)(B)(i), (iii). 
 257  Garrett, supra note 240, at 1160. 
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extra clarity by Congress with respect to sufficiency of purpose and fit.  If 
there is no funding or no funding mitigation expressly indicated for a 
federal mandate above the threshold,258 a point of order can be raised, thus 
requiring the clarity of a vote on the sufficiency of the mandate’s purpose 
to overcome the unfunded mandate objection.259 
Any state can thus have its representative delegation make a “claim” 
on its behalf, if one subscribes to the “political safeguards of federalism” 
view of how elected Senators relate to their states.260  The point of order 
can only be overcome by majority vote, which remains politically 
consequential insofar as it forces a separate roll call vote requiring 
Members of Congress to take a visible stance on that particular issue.261  
Furthermore, the Senate has on occasion voted to raise that threshold to 
sixty votes.262  While that threshold reverted back to simple majority in 
subsequent fiscal years, the threat of elevation in any given year remains.263 
Another feature of UMRA that suggests that the enforcement 
mechanism treats subnational governments as rights-holders rather than 
mere beneficiaries of an otherwise structural public duty, is that those 
enforcement provisions can be “waived” or at least go voluntarily 
unclaimed by states and localities, consistent with H.L.A. Hart’s account of 
choice-rights.264  Section 425(b) contains the following rule of 
construction: 
 
 258  Congressional Budget Act § 424(a)(1), 2 U.S.C. § 658c(a)(1) (imposing a $50 
million per fiscal year threshold for intergovernmental mandates).  Congressional Budget 
Act § 424(b), 2 U.S.C. § 658c(b)(1) (setting the threshold at $100 million for private 
mandates).  
 259  Garrett, supra note 240, at 1161–68 (detailed description of the mechanics and 
incentive structure behind points of order generally and UMRA points of order in 
particular). 
 260  Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); 
see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 184 (1980).   
 261  Garrett, supra note 240,  at 1161, 1163–64; see also Elizabeth Garrett, Framework 
Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1496, 1503–04 (2008). 
 262  H. Con. Res. 95, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted) https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-
congress/house-concurrent-resolution/95 (the fiscal year 2006 budget resolution).  The 
Senate also included a supermajority threshold in an early version of the fiscal year 2010 
budget resolution, S. Amdt. 819 (Enzi) to S. Con. Res. 13, 111th Cong. (2009) 
https://www.congress.gov/amendment/111th-congress/senate-amendment/819?s=a&r=162.  
This change, however, dropped out before the budget resolution was finalized.  
 263  See id.; see also Robert Jay Dilger, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: History, 
Impact, and Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 17 (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20190828_R40957_03df232a05ad57fb108a129a6c0c
8d50e45ad445.pdf.   
 264  Congressional Budget Act § 425(b), 2 U.S.C. § 658d(b) (2018).  For a view that a 
rights-holder is one who can waive the right, see H.L.A. Hart, Legal Rights, in ESSAYS ON 
BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 162, 186 (1982). 
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The provisions [of this subsection] shall not be construed to 
prohibit or otherwise restrict a State, local, or tribal government 
from voluntarily electing to remain subject to the original 
Federal intergovernmental mandate, complying with the 
programmatic or financial responsibilities of the original Federal 
intergovernmental mandate and providing the funding 
necessary.265 
7. History 
In the floor debates over UMRA, Democratic politicians voiced 
“concerns that the legislation would impede the federal government’s 
ability to protect public health,”266 while the allies of the so-called 
intergovernmental lobby were vocal in support.267  But business groups 
were also strong UMRA proponents, condemning environmental laws such 
as the Clean Air Act as examples of unfunded federal mandates.268  The 
constituency favoring UMRA (states and small business, supported by big 
business) was quite similar to the constituency backing the RFA.269  It is 
perhaps not so surprising then that non-federalism-related purposes 
burrowed their way into UMRA by amendment, imposing “private-sector 
cost impact statements when the economic burdens [exceed] 100 million 
USD.”270  UMRA thus elevates private economic freedom as well. 
III. OTHER EXAMPLES OF SIMILAR LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY 
HEIGHTENED JUSTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
Here I wish to argue for the similarity of a few additional measures 
imposing heightened justification requirements.  By now I hope it is 
evident that these heightened justification requirements exist on some kind 
of quasi-rights continuum, and I make the case here for these other 
examples as points on the same spectrum. 
A. Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
Although the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is not primarily 
considered an impact assessment requirement, it shares features of the 
subconstitutional rights we have examined.  It constitutes an RIA insofar as 
 
 265  2 U.S.C. § 425(b).  
 266  Shapiro & Moran, supra note 145, at 167 (citing Dilger, supra note 263).  Senator 
Frank Lautenberg protested that OSHA and EPA would be hampered in their ability to set 
minimum standards to address the collective action problems of a patchwork regime.  Id. 
 267  Garrett, supra note 240, at 1136. 
 268  Shapiro & Moran, supra note 145, at 168. 
 269  Id. at 169. 
 270  See S. Amdt. 19 (Kempthorne) to S. 1, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted) https://www.con 
gress.gov/amendment/104th-congress/senate-amendment/19/all-info.  
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an assessment of an agency’s potential impact on endangered species is 
necessary in order to determine whether the ESA’s strictly conditioned 
bans on federal action apply.  Accordingly, ESA obligations include 
required biological assessments under § 7(c), as well as opinions specifying 
impact as part of the § 7(a)(4) written statements issued by the Secretary of 
Interior or Secretary of Commerce incident to required consultation by the 
acting agency.271 
ESA § 7(a)(2) commands: 
“Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with . . . the 
Secretary, insure that any action . . . by such agency . . . is not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or 
adverse modification of habitat of such species which is 
determined . . . to be critical.”272 
Any agency action that burdens these values in this way can only 
proceed if it has been granted an exemption, which in turn depends on 
sufficiency of purpose and fit. 
1. Scope 
The ESA actually features two thresholds of burden to species 
preservation.  Section 7(a)(3) requires consultation with the Secretary over 
“prospective agency action . . . if the applicant has reason to believe that an 
endangered species or a threatened species may be present in the area 
affected by his project and that implementation of such action will likely 
affect such species.”273 
By contrast, the previously mentioned § 7(a)(2) has a higher 
threshold; namely, agency action that is “likely to jeopardize the continued 
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the 
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species.”274  But this 
paragraph also places a correspondingly heavier requirement, beyond mere 
consultation, upon agency actions that reach the higher threshold of 
impingement upon the favored value.  Such impingement forces an agency 
to obtain an “exemption” from the § 7(a)(2) prohibition through prescribed 
procedures.  An exemption involves formal hearings and votes of the multi-
member committee,275 colloquially called the “God Squad,”276 hinging 
 
 271  Endangered Species Act (ESA) § 7(a), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)–(d) (2018). 
 272  ESA § 7(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) 
 273  ESA § 7(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
 274  ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (emphasis added).   
 275  ESA § 7(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (listing in subparagraph (3) the seven members of 
the “God Squad”); ESA § 7(h), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h); ESA § 7(h) (listing the requirement 
that “the Committee shall make a final determination whether or not to grant an 
exemption . . . by a vote of not less than five of its members,” and then articulating the 
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upon certain substantive showings such as sufficiency of purpose and fit.277 
2. Sufficiency of Purpose 
Section 7(h)(1)(A) provides that voting committee members may 
grant exemptions on the basis of determinations that “the action is of 
regional or national significance,”278 that “such agency action is in the 
public interest,” and that “the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the 
benefits of alternative courses of action.”279 
These formulations all amount to a finding that the purpose of the 
action is sufficient to justify an exemption. 
3. Fit 
Section 7(h)(1)(A)(i) also lists a fit requirement as one of the 
determinations required for the committee member to vote in favor of an 
exemption.  Specifically, the impingement upon endangered species by the 
agency must be justified by a Committee determination that “there are no 
reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action.” 280  Section 
7(h)(1)(B) goes on to require that the Committee granting the exemption 
must: 
[E]stablis[h] such reasonable mitigation and enhancement 
measures, including, but not limited to, live propagation, 
transplantation, and habitat acquisition and improvement, as are 
necessary and appropriate to minimize the adverse effects of the 
agency action upon the endangered species, threatened species, 
or critical habitat concerned.281 
4. Claiming 
Section 7(n) grants judicial review under the APA, of any decision of 
the Endangered Species Committee under subsection (h),282 though with 
notorious standing limitations.283  The statute also provides for attorney’s 
fees.284 
 
determinations that must be made to justify such a vote). 
 276  See Jared des Rosiers, Exemption Process Under the Endangered Species Act: How 
the God Squad Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 833 n.55 (1991).   
 277  ESA § 7(h)(1)(A)–(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)–(B).   
 278  ESA § 7(h)(1)(A)(iii), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(iii).   
 279  ESA § 7(h)(1)(A)(ii), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii).   
 280  ESA § 7(h)(1)(A)(i), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i). 
 281  ESA § 7(h)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(B).   
 282  ESA § 7(n), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n).  
 283  See Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).  
 284  See ESA § 11(g)(2)(C)(3)(B)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(C)(3)(B)(4).   
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5. History 
Indeed, the court has intervened to enforce these species-preservation 
norms, with TVA v. Hill serving as a vivid reminder.285  The Court held that 
the statute forbade cost-benefit balancing in a way that prompted Sunstein 
to muse that “perhaps the [ESA] is best taken to be rooted in a theory of 
rights, one that rebuts the presumption in favor of cost-benefit 
balancing.”286  The God Squad has rarely found occasion to overcome the 
ESA’s protections,287 though occasionally agencies engage in negotiations 
over discretionary decisions such as whether to designate or list a relevant 
species or habitat, or whether “jeopardy” to the relevant species is found.288 
But this anomalously stringent subconstitutional provision was, like 
other quasi-rights on this list, the result of a decades-long struggle to 
entrench biodiversity as a favored value.  The Endangered Species 
Preservation Act enacted in 1966 merely provided a means of listing native 
species with limited protections.289  It was amended in 1969, and only 
assumed its current form in 1973.  The provisions were then weakened five 
years later with the allowance of exemptions from the ESA’s protections 
through the “God Squad” process described above.290  Major amendments 
have since passed and Congress has periodically intruded to grant relief for 
those who sought to overcome this presumptive protection of endangered 
species without prevailing in the God Squad process.291 
B. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)292 
1. History 
RFRA arose in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
 
 285  See 437 U.S. 153, 194–95 (1978) (applying the ESA strictly according to its own 
terms to enjoin a 100 million USD project for the sake of protecting a critical habitat for a 
snail darter). 
 286  CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE 68 (2002); see also Amy Sinden, In 
Defense of Absolutism, Combating the Power of Politics in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 1405, 1410–11 (2005) (also characterizing the absolutism of the ESA as a rights-
approach).   
 287  See Sinden, supra note 286, at 1504 (observing that the committee has “convened on 
only a handful of occasions in the quarter century since its creation, and even in those rare 
instances, it has never granted a wholesale exemption from the ESA’s protections”).   
 288  Id. at 1504–05.   
 289  Endangered Species Act: A History of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, U.S. FISH 
& WILDLIFE SERV. (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/laws-policies/esa-
history.html.   
 290  Sinden, supra note 286, at 1504–05. 
 291  Id. at 1506–07.  
 292  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2018). 
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Smith.293  Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court under the Free Exercise Clause 
of the Constitution applied strict scrutiny294 not only to laws that target 
religion but also to laws that are “neutral toward”295 and only incidentally 
burden religion.296  By analogy, I argue in this article that generally 
applicable laws not targeted at health per se, but which burden health 
nonetheless, should receive HIA scrutiny. 
The Smith decision in 1990 was a pivot for the Supreme Court.297  
Two individuals were fired for ceremonially ingesting peyote thereby 
violating employer and state-imposed drug restrictions.298  Because Smith 
and Black were fired for misconduct, just as Sherbert was fired for refusal 
to work on Saturdays, they did not qualify for unemployment benefits.299  
The general criminal prohibition on drug use and possession was plainly 
neutral to religion and applied to all individuals regardless of religion.300  
Therefore, according to Justice Scalia writing for a 6–3 majority, the 
compelling interest and least restrictive means test was not triggered.301  
Religious minority interests could seek protection in the general horse-
trading of the political process and would not otherwise be singled out for 
special justification of any incidental burden.302 
Congress, in RFRA, re-imposed strict scrutiny, requiring a showing of 
compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means for generally 
applicable laws that substantially burdened “a person’s exercise of 
religion.”303  Here, we examine RFRA insofar as the heightened 
justification for federal actions parallels other regulatory analysis 
requirements. 
 
 293  494 U.S. 872 (1990) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to neutral, generally applicable 
laws that impose a substantial burden on the practice of religion); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000bb(a)(2)–(4); §2000bb–1(a). 
 294  See e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
 295  This phrase is used in the Congressional findings for RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb(a)(2); § 2000bb(a)(4). 
 296  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  
 297  The decision was presaged by Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 
485 U.S. 439 (1988).  
 298  494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).   
 299  Id.  
 300  Id. at 878.   
 301  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
 302  Id. at 902.  
 303  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–1(a), (b) (2018).  Though City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997), partially invalidated RFRA insofar as Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment power 
was deemed insufficient to authorize the imposition of RFRA upon the states, Congress 
restored some state applications of RFRA in the form of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), relying on Congress’ Commerce and Spending 
Powers instead.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. 
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2. Scope 
RFRA, like UMRA, covers both legislative and regulatory activity, 
declaring that “[t]his chapter applies to all Federal law, and the 
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether 
adopted before or after November 16, 1993.”304  RFRA evidently 
contemplates lookback application as well.305 
But not every regulation or statute is captured insofar as the law must 
still qualify as one that “substantially burdens a person’s exercise of 
religion.”  This parameter mirrors other RIA threshold requirements.  
NEPA kicks in only when a “major federal action significantly affects the 
quality of the human environment,” and the RFA is triggered if a rule will 
have “a significant economic effect on a substantial number of small 
entities.”306 
The threshold term, “exercise of religion” is defined in the statute as 
“any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by or central to, a 
system of religious belief.”307  The threshold term “substantial burden,” 
however, is not further specified in the statute and has been contested in 
court.308 
3. Sufficiency of Purpose 
The “sufficiency of purpose” that a law must display in order to 
justify substantial burden on religious exercise is manifestly required.  The 
statute prevents such burden unless “that application of the burden to the 
person . . . is in furtherance of a compelling government interest.”309 
4. Fit 
RFRA’s demand for fit in the event of government action 
countervailing religious liberty is also readily apparent.  The government 
must demonstrate that the burdening measure is “the least restrictive means 
 
 304  Id. § 2000bb–3(a). 
 305  Some would argue that the “lookback” application is the only portion of RFRA on 
sound constitutional footing.  See, e.g., Branden Lewiston, RFRA as Legislative 
Entrenchment, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 26, 26 (2017).   
 306  See supra text accompanying note 160. 
 307  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2(4) (referencing § 2000cc–5). 
 308  See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (concluding that the 
condition that for-profit employers who offer health insurance include mere coverage of 
certain contraception options, whose use is within the election of the employees themselves, 
in order to enjoy a tax benefit for offering health benefits voluntarily was not so attenuated 
as to fail the “substantial burden” threshold).  Observers have noted that the substantial 
burden test was thereby defined down to virtually nothing.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Free 
Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1497 (2015) (stating the substantial burden 
test merely required “‘plaintiffs’ assertions that a law imposes a substantial burden”). 
 309  42 U.S.C § 2000bb–1(b)(1).   
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of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”310 
5. Claiming 
The government can be called to account for nonconformance with 
RFRA by a putative individual rights-bearer.  The statute allows an 
aggrieved person to assert a “violation of this section . . . as a claim or 
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a 
government.”311 
In 2006, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal,312 a unanimous Supreme Court blocked the government from 
enforcing the Controlled Substances Act in such a way as to burden a 
religious group’s use of hallucinogenic tea.  Following the implementation 
of the Affordable Care Act in 2013, Hobby Lobby, a for-profit corporation 
closely held by family members with certain religious beliefs, successfully 
challenged the regulation stipulating that non-grandfathered employer 
health plans cover contraceptives.313 
6. Isomorphism 
Through this discussion it should be apparent that RFRA contains the 
same structural elements as the other regulatory analysis statutes: (1) a 
trans-substantive law passed by Congress; (2) imposing requirements upon 
federal action across jurisdictional bounds; (3) triggered by a threshold 
impact upon a favored value; (4) when that value is not otherwise protected 
by the Constitution; (5) imposing a condition of heightened justification for 
that burden; and (6) consisting of a showing of sufficiency of purpose and 
fit.  “Impact assessment,” in terms of a showing of “substantial burden,” is 
required in order to make the threshold showing for the heightened scrutiny 
to apply.  The only conceivable differences between RFRA and the other 
impact assessments we have examined lie in, first, the mechanism of 
enforcement and second, the timing of when the justification must be 
produced, a matter which is related to the mode of enforcement.  According 
to UMRA, any member of Congress can raise a point of order to prevent 
the statute from going forward for failure to fulfill the heightened 
justification requirement.  Under RFRA, the power of the courts can be 
harnessed to strike the rule or statute for failure to fulfill the heightened 
justification requirement.  Of course, because of the nature of judicial 
review as opposed to points of order, the justification need not be tendered 
ex ante before the measure is issued as the court action will usually occur 
 
 310  Id. § 2000bb–1(b)(2).   
 311  Id. § 2000bb–1(c). 
 312  546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 313  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.  
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post hoc. 
C. Assessment of Federal Regulations and Policies on Families 
The Fiscal Year 1999 Treasury Appropriations bill required that any 
agency rule include an assessment of the rule’s impact on family well-
being.314  This interest, however, was specifically defined in a way that 
reveals an agenda of hidden purposes not apparent from the labeling of the 
interest at issue.  The provision demanded the following: 
Before implementing policies and regulations that may affect 
family well-being, each agency shall assess such actions with 
respect to whether . . . 
(2) [agency actions] strengthen or erode the stability or safety of 
the family and, particularly, the marital commitment; [or] 
(3) [they affect] authority and rights of the parents in the 
education, nurture and supervision of their children; 
(3) [the agency action] helps the family perform its functions, or 
substitutes governmental activity for the function; [ . . . ] 
(8) the action establishes an implicit or explicit policy 
concerning the relationship between the behavior and personal 
responsibility of youth, and the norms of society.315 
These specifications of family well-being are neither politically 
neutral nor inevitable.  Setting aside this politically contestable framing of 
“family well-being” as personal responsibility, autonomy from 
government, and the sanctity of marriage, what is notable about this 
statutory text is the qualitative rather than quantitative identification of 
burden.  The qualitative definition of burdens suggest that fungibility or 
tradeoff against other values is not assumed, and therefore sets this impact 
assessment apart from the default CBA that would apply to any other type 
of implicated interest lacking a special RIA privilege. 
1. Sufficiency of Purpose and Fit 
The family impact assessment lacks specificity in requiring purpose or 
fit.  It does demand, however, that the regulation be assessed for whether 
the proposed benefits of the action justify the impact on the family. 
Under § 654(d) of the appropriations language, a rule that is 
determined to have a negative effect on families must be supported with an 
“adequate rationale.”  “Adequacy of rationale” could be understood to 
require a sufficiently important purpose or reason for the “family burdens” 
 
 314  Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. 105–277 § 654, 112 Stat. 2681; 5 U.S.C. § 301 note (1999) (containing language 
establishing a family impact assessment). 
 315  Pub. L. 105–277 § 654(c).   
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inflicted.  The adequacy of the rationale could also imply an associated fit 
requirement such that no portion of the burden is unnecessary and 
unjustifiable. 
2. Claiming 
The provision specifically states: “This section is not intended to 
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by 
a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any 
person.”316  Members of Congress may demand compliance, however.  
According to § 654(e), “Upon request by a Member of Congress relating to 
a proposed policy or regulation, an agency shall conduct an assessment . . . 
and shall provide a certification and rationale.”  Presumably failure to 
comply could result in practical consequences such as oversight hearings or 
appropriations riders. 
Though the rights-like features characterizing other impact 
assessments are lacking somewhat in clarity, the Family Impact 
Assessment may yet prove a forerunner of a more robust future regulatory 
analysis requirement.317  Indeed, the Family Impact Assessment itself was 
preceded by EO 12606.318 
D. Private Property/Takings Executive Order 
In the late 1980’s, Reagan signed EO 12630, “Governmental Actions 
and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights.”319  It has 
not since been revoked.  Under this EO, before any agency undertakes 
regulation of private property to protect public health or safety, it must 
show sufficiency of purpose and fit.320 
1. Scope 
This heightened justification requirement clearly extends to regulatory 
burdens on private property that do not rise to the level of takings.  Even 
without examining the case law on regulatory takings, this point is evident 
from the language of the EO.  Part of the statement of heightened 
justification required before the agency takes action is an “[e]stimate, to the 
 
 316  Id. § 654(f). 
 317  Some groups continue to advocate in this vein.  See, e.g., Family Impact Institute, 
History, PURDUE UNIV., https://purdue.edu/hhs/hdfs/fii/about/history (last visited Feb. 2, 
2019). 
 318  Exec. Order No. 12,606, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,188 (Sept. 2, 1987). 
 319  Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Mar. 18, 1988).  See 340B Drug Pricing 
Program Ceiling Price and Manufacturer Civil Monetary Penalties Regulation, 82 Fed. Reg. 
14,332 (Mar. 20, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 10), for an example of recent 
regulation complying with its requirements. 
 320  53 Fed. Reg. 8859.  
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extent possible, [of] the potential cost to the government in the event that a 
court later determines that the action constituted a taking.”321  Thus, the set 
of actions to which the EO is expected to apply exceeds the actions that 
will later be found a taking.  Meanwhile, the Congressional Research 
Service reported at the time that “the majority of taking principles stated or 
implied in the Executive Order 12630 overestimated the likelihood of a 
taking.”322 
2. Sufficiency of Purpose 
The agency must first, “[i]dentify clearly, with as much specificity as 
possible, the public health or safety risk created by the private property use 
that is the subject of the proposed action.”323  Thus, the purpose of the 
regulatory action must be specifically articulated. 
3. Fit 
The EO next requires agencies to “[e]stablish that such proposed 
action substantially advances the purpose of protecting public health and 
safety against the specifically identified risk.”324  The agency must show 
what Alexy might call “suitability,”325 namely, that the means do advance 
the important justifying end or purpose identified above. 
Also, the agency must “[e]stablish to the extent possible that the 
restrictions imposed on the private property are not disproportionate to the 
extent to which the use contributes to the overall risk.”326  This provision 
requires another aspect of fit, namely, no excess burden that is somehow 
not sufficiently linked with, and therefore cannot draw sufficient 
justification from, the important purpose. 
4. No Claiming under Executive Orders 
Though these measures lack claiming mechanisms,327 they should be 
seen for their significance within a dynamic arc.  They are present at one 
moment in the ongoing struggle over popular conceptions of rights in the 
 
 321  Exec. Order No. 12,630 § 4, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Mar. 18, 1988). 
 322  ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RES. SERV., COMPARISON OF TAKING PRINCIPLES IN 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12630 WITH SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE AND RELATED 
QUESTIONS (1988) (cited in GAO’s Recent Report on the Implementation of Exec. Order 
12630 and the State of Federal Agency Protections of Private Property Rights: Hearing 
before the H. Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of John D. 
Echeverria, Exec. Dir., Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Inst., Geo. U.L. Center)).  
 323  Exec. Order No. 12,630 § 4(d)(1), 53 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8861 (Mar. 18, 1988).   
 324  Id. § 4(d)(2).   
 325  See ALEXY, supra note 107, at 396–98. 
 326  Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 318, at § (d)(3).   
 327  Erica Newland, Executive Orders in Court, 124 Yale L.J. 2026, 2075-2082 (2015). 
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U.S. and may well evolve into a more robust right in the future. 
Many of the other measures that feature mature claiming provisions 
started out in precursor form.  The Assessment of Impact on Families was 
an opportunistic statutory expansion built upon an idea first encountered in 
another executive order from the Reagan years.328  The Paperwork 
Reduction Act was preceded by the Federal Reports Act.329  UMRA 
succeeded the State and Local Government Cost Estimates Act of 1981 
which had been in place for thirteen years but lacked the accountability 
provided by points of order.330  Similarly, the extra-constitutional 
protection of private property from regulatory burden may now take the 
form of a mere executive order, but bills have been introduced since to 
codify it.331  In 1995, H.R. 925 passed the House, though it later died in the 
Senate.332  This bill would have triggered agencies to compensate property 
owners for the regulatory burdens on their private property use if that 
federal agency action reduced the property’s fair market value by a certain 
threshold percentage (eventually set at twenty percent).333  Meanwhile, the 
EO itself has enjoyed significant longevity,334 continuing to elevate the 
protection of private property rights above the constitutional baseline, just 
as RFRA does for the protection of free exercise, and as UMRA does for 
the protection of federalism-related values. 
E. Other Impact Assessments Established by the Executive Branch 
Other EO’s on the continuum may or may not yet merit the label 
“rights.”  Some constitute duties to the public at large, rather than duties 
with corresponding rights.  For instance, President Clinton signed EO 
13,175 for “Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal 
Governments,”335 which bears some similarities to UMRA.  No agency 
 
 328  See supra text accompanying note 318. 
 329  Shapiro & Moran, supra note 145, at 17–18. 
 330  State and Local Government Cost Estimates Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-108, 95 
Stat. 1510  repealed by Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 104, 
109 Stat. 48, 62; see also Garrett, supra note 240, at 1153, 1160–63. 
 331  Private Property Rights Act of 1991, S. 50, 102nd Cong. (1991) (introduced by 
Senator Steven Symms). 
 332  Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995).  This 
provision was also included in the Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, H.R. 9 
§§ 201–210, 104th Cong. (1995) as a component of the Republican’s Contract with America.  
See SINCLAIR, supra note 188, at 113–33; see also THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO 
HARM 78 (2013) (explaining that Senate Republicans failed to overcome filibusters on 
various omnibus regulatory reform efforts.). 
 333  SINCLAIR, supra note 188, at 122–25. 
 334  See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-03-1015, REGULATORY TAKINGS: IMPLEMENTATION 
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER ON GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AFFECTING PRIVATE PROPERTY USE 4 
(2003). 
 335  Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 9, 2000).   
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should promulgate a regulation that has “tribal implications” or preempts 
tribal laws without consultation with tribal officials or without providing 
OMB with the summary impact statement.336  This “tribal summary impact 
statement” need, however, only describe the agency’s consultation and 
state the extent to which the tribal concerns have been met.  No particular 
countervailing purpose or minimization of burden is required. 
President Clinton’s EO 12,988, “Civil Justice Reform,”337 directed 
agencies to review all new and old regulations to ensure that they are 
“written to minimize litigation.”338  Again, this deviates from the canonical 
requirement of requiring a sufficient countervailing purpose and certainly 
lacks any vision of particular claimant whose rights correspond to this duty. 
President George W. Bush issued EO 13211, “Actions Concerning 
Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution or Use,” 
which required federal agencies to prepare a “Statement of Energy Effect” 
(SEE).339  This SEE is triggered only when federal actions may have 
“significant adverse effect” on “supply, distribution, and use of energy.”340 
OMB issued a memorandum in 2001 listing circumstances that would 
constitute “a significant adverse effect,” including reductions in crude oil 
supply in an amount over 10,000 barrels per day, reductions in coal or 
natural gas production of a certain amount, and increases in the cost of 
energy production and distribution in excess of one percent.341  Some 
environmental advocates warned this EO could “curtail critical habitat 
designation or other environmental protection”342 and therefore urged 
Obama to repeal it in his first hundred days.343  He declined to do so, and 
this EO remains in effect today.344 
And oddly, the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) itself fell 
short of the specificity of the impact assessments we have looked at thus 
far, merely requiring agencies to “take into account the effects of the 
 
 336  Id.   
 337  Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (Feb. 7, 1996). 
 338  Id. § 3(a)(2). 
 339  Exec. Order No. 13,211, 66 Fed. Reg. 28355 (May 22, 2001). 
 340  Id. 
 341  OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. PRESIDENT, OMB MEMORANDUM M-01-27, 
GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING EXEC. ORDER 13211 (2001). 
 342  Elizabeth Glass Geltman et al., Inquiry into the Implementation of Bush’s Executive 
Order 13211 and the Impact on Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 27 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 225, 228 (2016).   
 343  REBECCA BRATSPIES ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, PROTECTING PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT BY THE STROKE OF A PRESIDENTIAL PEN: SEVEN EXECUTIVE 
ORDERS FOR THE PRESIDENT’S FIRST 100 DAYS 33 (2008).  
 344  Elizabeth Glass Geltman et al., Impact of Executive Order 13211 on Environmental 
Regulation: An Empirical Study, 89 ENERGY POL’Y 302, 302 (2016). 
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undertaking” on historical properties.345  The implementing regulation, 
however, contemplates a process that at least partly tracks NEPA. 346  
NHPA-compliance is even accorded judicial review as an adjunct to 
judicial review for NEPA-compliance.347 
Examples abound.348  But many of these impact assessment 
requirements depart from the structured, individuated analysis that 
characterizes rights.  For instance, whom does the energy order protect?  
Certainly, energy sector interests are protected.  In addition, the provision 
seems to contemplate the interests of the general public who pay energy 
bills and depend on energy supplies.  Though these examples impose 
certain assessment duties upon agencies, they can be fairly characterized as 
duties to the public-at-large. 
F. Regulatory Right to Know 
The misleadingly named “Regulatory Right-to-Know Act” falls short 
of a right.  Passed in the 2001 Treasury and General Government 
Appropriations Act,349 it is understood as a legislative rider imposing a 
permanent reporting obligation upon OMB.350  Its precursors include 
similar reporting requirements that took the form of one-year riders.351  The 
Regulatory-Right-to-Know report is due only once a year rather than 
triggered with each agency action.  It is submitted to Congress along with 
the President’s budget and requires reporting in the aggregate, totaling the 
costs and benefits of all major rules, and stratifying by agency and major 
rule.  The agency must produce not just an estimate of total costs and 
benefits, but impacts on other favored values: “state, local, and tribal 
 
 345  16 U.S.C. § 470 (2018) (current version of Act in scattered sections of 54 U.S.C.); 36 
C.F.R. § 800 (2019). 
 346  See Tyler v. Cisneros, 136 F. 3d 603, 608–09 (9th Cir. 1998).  See also Boarhead 
Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1024 (finding that despite an implied right of action under 
the APA for judicial review associated with NHPA, the district court lacked jurisdiction for 
other reasons.). 
 347  See Cisneros, 136 F. 3d 603, 608–09. 
 348  See e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. § 203 (1974), amended by Executive 
Order No. 11,949, 3 C.F.R. § 161 (1977) (requiring statements of inflationary impact.). 
 349  31 U.S.C. §1105 (2018).  Similar provisions were previously passed as fiscal year 
riders in § 625 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 
1999, Pub. L. No. 105–61 (1998); see also Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105–277, § 638(a), 112 Stat 2681, 
2681–525 (1998).  
 350  See CAREY, supra note 120, at 7 n.31 (stating that this note “put in place a permanent 
requirement for an OMB report on regulatory costs and benefits”). 
 351  Angela Antonelli, Regulatory Right to Know: Tracking the Costs and Benefits of 
Federal Regulation, HERITAGE FOUND. (April 20, 1999), https://www.heritage.org/governme 
nt-regulation/report/regulatory-right-know-tracking-the-costs-and-benefits-federal. 
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governments, small businesses, wages, and economic growth.”352  The 
generality of this requirement renders this RIA more of a duty to the 
public-at-large. 
The measure may seem duplicative insofar as costs and benefits must 
already be considered for each major rule under EO 12,866.  Because EOs 
do not, however, apply to independent regulatory agencies, which include 
such major actors as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Reserve, and the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, this Congressional “Right-to-Know” 
provision does at least ensure agency coverage. 
G. Agency-Specific RIAs 
There are many other RIA provisions that I neglect here because they 
are not trans-substantive, applying to a narrow segment of agencies.  As 
such, they may be indistinguishable from statutorily-mandated factors that 
the agency must consider when regulating.353 
For instance, according to § 1102 of the Social Security Act, 
regulations implementing the Medicare and Medicaid titles are not to be 
advanced without consideration of their effects on rural hospitals.354 
Similarly, § 106 of the National Securities Market Improvement Act 
of 1996 requires the SEC to always consider, “in addition to the protection 
of investors, whether [an] action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.”355  
The Department of Agriculture (USDA) has issued a departmental 
policy requiring a civil rights impact analysis for all loans or “conditional 
commitments.”356  I leave these RIAs aside for now.357 
IV. THE GLARING OMISSION OF HEALTH 
A. Health is Not on Equal Footing 
Thus far, our discussion reveals a field of contest over conceptions of 
rights.  A picture emerges of ongoing struggle to elevate certain protected 
interests to rights status.  Moreover, this struggle is happening in the 
 
 352  31 U.S.C. § 1105 (2018); Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–554, § 624, 114 
Stat. 2763, 2763A–161(a)(2). 
 353  See CAREY, supra note 120, at 11. 
 354  Social Security Act § 1102(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2018). 
 355  15 U.S.C. § 77b (2018); Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
Toward a Framework of Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 1987 (2013). 
 356  7 C.F.R. § 4279.60 (2019). 
 357  See 22 U.S.C. § 2576 (2018) (requiring disarmament impact statements for all new 
weapons systems); Department of Transportation Act § 4(f), 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2018).  
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legislative and administrative domains. 
How would we characterize the state of play?  By this snapshot, we 
enjoy a panoply of negative rights, namely, freedom from government-
imposed paperwork, freedom for small businesses from economic burdens, 
and religious freedom beyond constitutional levels of protection.  State 
interests are shielded from economically burdensome federal mandates, 
property owners assert freedom from subconstitutional regulatory takings, 
and “traditional” families enjoy certain autonomies.  But are we free from 
government action that burdens people’s health?  In some politically 
motivated instances, we virtually ban HIA, as seen in the case of guns and 
their effect on health.358  We have indirect claims under NEPA and the 
ESA, in the form of protected interests in environmental protection.  
Environmental entitlements are urgent, but classic environmental exposure 
is not the only threat to health.  There is a glaring gap for the protection of 
basic human well-being.  Therefore, I propose we institute an HIA 
requirement. 
The selective imposition of accounting and justification requirements 
provides a familiar procedural means of institutionalizing substantive 
norms.  Selectively procedural and therefore “semi-substantive” means of 
protecting background rights have been noted in other contexts.359 
V. THE PROPOSAL 
Here I present options to consider for an HIA requirement that I 
believe should be enacted by Congress.  I offer these features as a starting 
point for policy debate. 
Because this HIA would be imposed by statute, not executive order, it 
would also cover independent regulatory agencies.  The bill would have to 
specify an HIA triggering condition based on the nature of a policy’s effect 
on health.  This threshold question has been crucial in each of the RIA 
 
 358  Language from the so-called Dickey Amendment has been inserted into 
appropriations bills each year since 1996, preventing funds from being used “to advocate 
[for] or promote gun control.”  This language, while not strictly forbidding research or data-
gathering on the health effects of gun policies, has chilled such conduct and remains in the 
FY2018 Appropriations bill.  See Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115–141, § 
210, 132 Stat. 348, 736 (2018).  For another example of statutory language that, although 
not yet enacted, seeks to prohibit impact assessment, see Local Zoning Decisions Protection 
Act of 2017, H.R. 482, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017), which declares, “[n]otwithstanding any 
other provision of law, no Federal Funds may be used to design, build, maintain, utilize, or 
provide access to a Federal database of geospatial information on community racial 
disparities or disparities in access to affordable housing.” 
 359  See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional 
Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 6, 
39 (2008). 
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measures we have examined.360  One could assign the duty to either an 
agency head or a designated health official.  This approach draws from the 
example set by RFA, whereby the agency head must decide and certify 
whenever government action avoids a threshold impact on “a substantial 
number of small entities.”361  A determination of “no substantial impact on 
health” would be subject to judicial review, just as a certification of 
insignificant impact is under RFA, or FONSI is under NEPA.362 
Alternatively, we could adapt the NEPA mechanism, whereby the 
impact analysis and detailed statement condition would apply to “major 
Federal actions significantly affecting” human health, and the agency 
would have to perform some kind of preliminary HIA to see if this 
threshold is met.  This two-step process parallels the mechanism of the 
preliminary “EA” under NEPA, which concludes in either a FONSI or 
proceeds to a full EIS.  This example illustrates how a trigger mechanism 
could be designed such that an early, smaller HIA might be required for all 
government action.  Meanwhile, the desire to avoid full HIAs might 
encourage health commitments across sectors as various government 
organs seek the HIA equivalent of “mitigated FONSIs.”363  I discuss below 
what form those mitigating actions might take.364  NEPA’s implementation 
also proves that a trigger threshold need not be specified in advance and 
can be elaborated case-by-case. 
For HIAs to empower beneficiaries as rights-holders, we should 
consider adding a mechanism for individuals or their representatives to 
initiate or call for the HIA heightened justification procedure.  The 
availability of judicial review for the determination of “no trigger” under 
RFA or FONSI under NEPA, would represent one avenue.  One could also 
establish a Chief Counsel for Health Advocacy along the lines of the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration, which would 
institutionalize representation of community health interests.365 
UMRA requires CBO to judge a bill’s projected costs to subnational 
governments against the triggering threshold to determine whether a point 
 
 360  See Shapiro & Moran, supra 145, at 170–71 (observing, “[m]uch as the vague 
definition of ‘significant impact’ in the [Regulatory Flexibility Act] was a source of agency 
discretion, the term ‘economically significant’ in the UMRA was largely left open to 
interpretation by individual agencies.  Critics of the Act noted that the vague definition 
allows agencies to evade assessments and benefit-cost analyses by determining that rules do 
not qualify as economically significant.  The GAO supported this criticism, stating that the 
Act gave agencies too much discretion in complying with the requirements.”).   
 361  See supra text accompanying notes 162–165. 
 362  Id.  See also text accompanying note 200, at 466–67. 
 363  See supra text accompanying note 199, at 932–33. 
 364  See infra text accompanying notes 388–389. 
 365  See supra text accompanying notes 180–185.  I thank Alan Morrison for this insight. 
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of order would lie against it.366  Similarly, GAO or some other entity 
designated by Congress could be tasked with calculating whether a bill 
“significantly affects human health.”367  Because health impacts are hard to 
quantify, we could use qualitative thresholds like those under the Family 
Impact Assessment.368  Alternatively, we could piggyback on existing RIA 
thresholds such that any action meeting the UMRA threshold as calculated 
by CBO would also be subject to full HIA.  For instance, the National 
Historic Preservation Act has piggybacked on NEPA such that any “major 
federal action” under NEPA also garners some process under NHPA.369 
Alternatively, “significantly affecting human health” could also be 
construed as adversely affecting key health indicators for a numerical 
threshold of persons by a certain magnitude.  I do not believe this approach 
requires an optimal set of thresholds.  Some initial proxies could be set, just 
as in Bush’s EO 13211, the effect on energy supply was established as 
adversely affecting energy prices by more than one percent, or a drop in 
crude oil production by 10,000 barrels a day or more.370  Similarly, the 
Gingrich Congress’ attempt to legislate regulatory takings identified a 
trigger of twenty percent reduction in the property’s fair market value.371  
The difficulty of setting a perfect threshold should not block the 
development of a provisional mechanism, just as those difficulties did not 
impede the establishment of RIAs protecting other values. 
A. Participatory 
HIAs should follow NEPA in promoting participation.372  This 
commitment would enhance an emerging feature of HIAs whereby they are 
taken up by disadvantaged communities and their supporting coalitions.  
For instance, HIAs have been wielded by Native Alaskan tribal groups to 
assert their interests in health and well-being through the state HIA process 
as well as NEPA.373  In Los Angeles, communities at risk of being 
 
 366  See supra note 233. 
 367  This idea takes inspiration from NEPA’s creation of CEQ and the Science Advisory 
Board, and PRA’s authorization of OIRA.  The HIA proposal, however, would authorize a 
Congressional agency like CBO rather than an executive entity. 
 368  See supra text accompanying note 314. 
 369  See Tyler v. Cisneros, 136 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 370  See supra note 333–334 and accompanying text.  
 371  See SINCLAIR, supra note 333. 
 372  See FERLO ET AL., NEPA LITIG. GUIDE, supra note 208, at 24–25.  
 373  See generally Integrated Activity Plan / Environmental Impact Statement, National 
Petroleum Reserve—Alaska, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR (Nov. 2012), 
https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/projects/nepa/5251/41004/43154/Vol2_NPR-
A_Final_IAP_FEIS.pdf (constituting an EIS process where the Alaskan Inter-Tribal Council 
participated heavily).  
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dislocated by stadium development used HIAs to block the proposal.374  
Causa Justa’s community organizers recruited the Alameda County public 
health department to survey the health harms of foreclosure.375  In San 
Francisco, HIAs contributed to the successful campaign for a living 
wage.376 
Any member of Congress could call for an HIA for legislative 
measures through a point of order.  Arguably, this mechanism allows 
democratic participation through lobbying, though this approach also 
renders the tool more accessible to powerful interests. 
B. Equity 
The measure I propose would embed a preference for health equity 
even more deeply into the HIA methodology.  HIA should impose 
justificatory burdens not just on actions with direct and indirect effects on 
human health, but also on actions exacerbating health inequality. 
A landmark British report on health disparities in 1998 declared that 
“all policies likely to have a direct or indirect effect on health should be 
evaluated in terms of their impact on health inequalities, and should be 
formulated in such a way that by favouring the less well off they will, 
wherever possible, reduce such inequalities.”377  The HIA could require 
that “all policies likely to have a direct or indirect effect on health must 
report their impact on health inequalities.” 
The “fit” requirements, which I discuss below, could then proceed to 
encourage policies to be formulated to favor the less well-off and reduce 
such inequalities.378  Mimicking the NEPA regulations which require the 
agency decision-maker to “record” the environmentally preferable 
alternative and justify how the agency rejected this alternative,379 the 
decision-maker could be required to “record” the most health equity-
promoting alternative.  If the agency chose otherwise, then it would have to 
describe the reasons and cite the specific “economic and technical 
 
 374  See HUMAN IMPACT PARTNERS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RAPID 
HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED FARMERS FIELD DEVELOPMENT (July 6, 
2012), https://playfairfarmersfield.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/ff-hia_final_full.pdf. 
 375  Victoria Colliver, Foreclosures Can Make You Sick, Report Says, SFGATE (Sept. 2, 
2010, 4:00 AM), https://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Foreclosures-can-make-you-sick-
report-says-3254499.php.  
 376  See Gottlieb et al., supra note 79, at 9.  
 377  DONALD ACHESON ET AL., INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH 
(1998). 
 378  For a recent proposal along these Rawlsian lines, see generally, Alicia Ely Yamin & 
Ole Frithjof Norheim, Taking Equality Seriously: Applying Human Rights Frameworks to 
Priority Setting in Health, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 296, 308, 324 (2014). 
 379  See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (2019). 
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considerations and agency statutory missions . . . including any essential 
considerations of national policy,” mirroring NEPA implementing 
language.380 
For those who believe that attention to equity represents an 
interjection of additional favored values into the HIA mechanism apart 
from health, there are a few responses.  One is that identification of health 
impacts necessarily includes identification of the distribution of health 
impacts as discussed earlier.381  Furthermore, social and economic 
inequality are major determinants of population health, with effects 
independent of those caused by poverty.382  Because the health gradient is 
steeper at lower SES levels, SES distribution must flow downward to have 
salutary effects on population health.  Promoting equity is closely 
congruent with the protection of health. 
Second, we can argue that other RIAs also include ideologically 
clustered secondary values.  UMRA sneaks in concern not only for burdens 
on States and localities, but also costs to private entities.  The PRA includes 
extra protection for privacy and small business. 
C. Impact Analysis 
The legislative and regulatory proposals that fall within the HIA 
measure’s scope of application must include reporting on the burdens they 
place on health and its distribution.  Again, some impact analysis and 
reporting would already exist from the threshold determination of the HIA 
measure’s applicability, just as some environmental impact analysis is done 
in the form of an EA to determine whether there is sufficient effect on the 
quality of the human environment to warrant a full EIS.383 
D. Sufficiency of Purpose 
These health-affecting measures must also clearly declare the purpose 
and need for that action.  As with the PRA, an agency must describe the 
“need” for the action being considered.384  Borrowing again from NEPA, 
need must be framed in terms of “economic and technical considerations 
and agency statutory missions . . . including any essential considerations of 
national policy. . . .”385 
As with UMRA, any legislative action would be subject to a 
sufficiency of purpose showing insofar as a separate vote to overcome the 
 
 380  Id. 
 381  See supra Part I.C.1, and text accompanying notes 66–72. 
 382  See supra text accompanying notes 36 at 323. 
 383  See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9, 1508.13. 
 384  See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c) (2018). 
 385  40 C.F.R. § 1505.2.  
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point of order would be required, implicitly demonstrating congressional 
conclusion that the non-health-sector policy furthers a sufficiently 
important purpose to justify the burden on health. 
E. Fit 
Just as earlier we discussed the incorporation of equity considerations 
by requiring a recording of the alternative that favors the least well-off,386 
that same recording requirement would apply to the least health-restrictive 
alternative. 
A point of order could be available for any health-affecting policy 
that, as we mention above, reduced major health indicators of a population 
by a certain threshold magnitude.  Just as unfunded mandates could avoid 
points of order if “funded,” HIA points of order could be avoided if the 
health-burdening legislation included listed health-promoting measures.  
We could deliberate over and devise what those might be, and I assume our 
judgments on the appropriate mitigation policies would change with 
changing circumstances.  For instance, PRA specifies certain mitigation 
strategies such as different compliance timetables and exemptions that must 
be considered when small businesses are burdened.387  ESA does the same 
for endangered species.388  The domain of must-consider health mitigation 
and improvement strategies could be developed, including investment in 
early childhood education, housing and other social determinants of health, 
or some other action that would reduce the Gini coefficient.389 
F. Enforcement/Claiming 
Beyond a point of order, compliance with regulatory as well as 
legislative HIA requirements could be subject to judicial review.  Even if 
not specifically authorized, courts might still, as they have with NEPA, 
construe judicial review to be available for whether agency action is 
arbitrary and capricious in light of inadequacies in HIA.390 
 
 
 386  See supra text accompanying notes 377–382. 
 387  See supra text accompanying note 136. 
 388  See supra text accompanying note 281. 
 389  See generally DAVID BUCK & SARAH GREGORY, IMPROVING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: A 
RESOURCE FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES (2013) (for nine recommendations to improve public 
health and reduce inequalities). 
 390  See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976); see also Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizen’s Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) (demonstrating a court’s ability to review 
NEPA decisions). 
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G. Lookback Review of Existing Federal Laws 
A true Ungerian destabilization391 right would affect existing policies 
as well as new policies.  Thus, any policy might be analyzed and 
challenged for its adverse effects on health and health equity.  While this 
notion may sound extreme, many of the examples I describe contain 
precisely such lookback and ongoing tailoring requirements affecting 
existing rather than new policies.392 
A recent example of lookback scrutiny is President Obama’s EO 
13563, Improving Regulations and Regulatory Review.  Section 6 requires 
agencies’ plans for periodic review of existing “significant” rules.393  A 
five-year sunset was proposed by the Gingrich Congress for all regulations 
subject to other types of RIAs.394 
Any already-approved legislation would be subject to judicial review, 
just as any measure is now subject to RFRA challenge.395  Prior legislation 
would also be vulnerable to a point of order certainly upon re-authorization 
or amendment, but could also draw a point of order at designated re-
evaluation points, including appropriations, as well. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I argue that we should move from sporadic to general use of HIAs to 
foster a rights-based approach to health.  My paper demonstrates that a 
negative procedural right to health could be enunciated in the form of an 
HIA requirement and thereby circumvent the difficulty of recognizing 
positive social and economic rights in the U.S. legal tradition.  Neoliberal 
rights “deflect consideration of how we are systemically connected to one 
another globally, irrespective of our choices.”396  HIAs would seed a right 
that pushes back on that view.397 
 
 391  How do we unwind states of the world that are damaging?  How do we combat the 
inertia and the power of incumbents as they affect future humanity?  For these goals we 
need destabilization rights.  ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-
NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 530 (1987) 
(explaining that “[d]estabilization rights protect the citizen’s interest in breaking open the 
large-scale organizations or the extended areas of social practice that remain closed to the 
destabilizing effects of ordinary conflict and thereby sustain insulated hierarchies of power 
and advantage”).  Scott Burris provided the insight that my proposal for HIAs resembles a 
call for destabilization rights.   
 392  See supra notes 173, 256, and 304; see 5 U.S.C. § 610 (2018); Congressional Budget 
Act § 425(a)(2)(B)(iii), 2 U.S.C. § 658d(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2018). 
 393  Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
 394  See Shapiro & Moran, supra note 145, at 172. 
 395  See supra text accompanying notes 304–305. 
 396  See O’Keefe, supra note 61, at 736.   
 397  See generally West, supra note 50, at 91–102 (arguing that we should revitalize 
rights in forms that recognize relational aspects of human nature). 
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Meanwhile the illusion of a distinction between positive and negative 
rights is ever more difficult to maintain.  The entitlements of the “haves” 
are so blatantly non-neutral and involve choices to affirmatively allocate 
state resources in their favor.  The increasing circumstances of scarcity also 
emphasize choice.  We are so interconnected with one another and these 
interconnections are now hypertrophic, as evidenced by climate change, 
360-degree surveillance,398 pervasive social media and algorithmic use of 
big data.  Coercion (or unconsented for harms or appropriations at the 
hands of others) occur routinely yet our traditional lines and bulwarks of 
liberty rights cannot contain the spillover.  We need a complementary right 
to insulate people from systemic harm as well. 
Our freedom is not the only thing we can claim against one another.  
Kantian rights of liberal autonomy protect a person in the abstract, stripped 
of all specific character.  A right to health, by attending to our embodied 
selves, could serve as a useful corrective.  Our liberal tradition sharply 
divides the right from the good, while a right to health presupposes 
continuity between rights and human flourishing.  At least we may start 
with a negative right to health as a baseline integrity from harm, 
supplementing traditional liberty and property rights by marking another 
place to toe the line, an additional index of justice. 
 
 
 398  See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE 
FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019). 
